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NOTES
Administrative Law-Needed-Freedom of Information
To what extent does the privilege for internal memoranda con-
tained in executive files insulate such documents from exposure? EPA
v. Mink' is only a partial resolution of the question. The decision holds
that factual material embodied in internal memoranda of executive
agencies must be disclosed if severable from those portions involving the
deliberative and policymaking processes of the executive.2 Access to
internal memoranda will be governed by "the same flexible, common
sense approach that has long governed private parties' discovery of such
documents. . . ." As part of this "common sense approach" to dis-
closure the Court found a possible limitation on judicial examination of
agency memoranda4 which had never been recognized under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FIA).5
I. THE CASE
Thirty-three members of Congress, acting as private citizens,
sought disclosure under the FIA of recommendations made to the Presi-
dent by a special committee concerning the proposed nuclear test on
Amchitka Island, Alaska.6 The government refused, arguing that all of
the documents came under the internal memoranda exemption of the
FIA. As an additional ground the government maintained that some of
the documents were also exempted because of their classified status.7
The district court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the documents fell within both exemptions.8
The court of appeals reversed, holding that including a document
1410 U.S. 73 (1973).
2 1d. at 85-94.
11d. at 91.
'i/. at 93.
55 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
1410 U.S. at 75-76 (1973).
75 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) reads in part as follows:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(I) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy . ..
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. . ..
Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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in a classified file is not sufficient to consider the document itself classi-
fied and thus exempted from disclosure under the FIA.9 The court also
held that factual material contained in internal memoranda is not ex-
empted under the act. ° The court remanded ordering the district court
to make an in camera review of all documents being sought. Those
documents under defense classifications were to be examined to deter-
mine if nonsecret components were separable and could be read sepa-
rately without distortion." Any such separable components, along with
those documents for which only the internal memoranda exemption had
been claimed, were to be reviewed to allow disclosure of factual infor-
mation unless inextricably intertwined with the policymaking process. 2
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that once
the government had shown a document classified pursuant to an execu-
tive order it was to be considered absolutely exempted. The judiciary
can not further examine the document or question the justification for
its classification. '3
The Court agreed with the court of appeals that only factual infor-
mation severable from language reflecting deliberations or recommen-
dations by executive officials could be disclosed. 4 However, the Court
limited in camera inspection of internal memoranda. The district court
may not inspect the documents if the agency involved can demonstrate
by testimony, affidavit, or sample document that the information sought
is beyond the range of what a private party could discover in litigation
with the agency.'" Perhaps most importantly, Mink can be read as
'Id. at 746.
l"id.
"d.
1Id.
"1410 U.S. at 84.
"Id. at 91-93.
"Id. at 93-94. This portion of the Court's opinion is susceptible to at least two interpretations.
The first is that the need of the claimant will be examined to decide whether in catnera inspection
will be allowed. See text accompanying notes 66-76 infra; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss,
Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 331-32 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nora. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384
F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967). A second interpretation is
that the inquiry merely determines whether any of the documents would fall into a category which
could never be discovered in litigation either because of some absolute privilege such as a state
secret not covered by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970) or because the information is of an extremely
delicate nature.
The discussion of need in this note will deal only with that point in the proceedings after it
has been decided that in camera examination is appropriate. The question of how that decision is
to be reached will not be directly examined further, although many of the elements entering into a
decision of what should be disclosed may also be important in deciding whether the court should
investigate the documents.
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holding that even information directed to the Chief Executive and used
by him in making important national decisions does fall within the
ambit of the FIA.16
The factual-deliberative distinction was based on a considerable
number of discovery and FIA cases. 17 The decision to limit in camera
review of internal memoranda was based on the belief that the purpose
of the privilege, the encouragement of open expression of opinion on
agency policy by agency employees, might be impaired even by re-
quiring that the documents be examined in camera.8
This note will concern itself solely with the internal memoranda
exemption.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE FIA
The purpose of the FIA is to "establish a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly deline-
ated statutory language. . ". ."' It was hoped that the act would allow
broad access into government files and remove the abuses"' of section 3
of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)Y.2
The internal memoranda exemption was included to protect the
free exchange of ideas and advice among agency personnel 2 by prevent-
ing it from having to operate in a "fishbowl. ' 23 In addition, the exemp-
tion was designed to preclude the premature disclosure of agency re-
cords24 and to avoid the use of the FIA as a substitute for discovery not
allowed in litigation.25
The internal memoranda exemption has been recognized as being
"1410 U.S. at 91-93.
11d. at 85-90 & nn. 12-16.
Id. at 92-94.
"IS. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
2
'See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H. REP.]; S.
REP. 5.
21Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
'-Outside consultants are usually considered to be within the exemption. It may be important
whether the consultant is paid by the government, and whether he represents public or private
interest. Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 93 S. Ct. 1352 (1973).
Limitations on the use of the exemption for outside consultants are suggested in Note, The
Freedon of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1047, 1063-66 (1973).
2H. REP. 10; see Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341-43 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
21S. REP, 9; H. REP.10.
2Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D. Neb. 1970); see Ackerly v. Ley, 420
F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969); H. REP. 10-11.
1973]
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closely tied to executive privilege.26 Indeed, it has been stated that the
act incorporates the recognized executive privilege for internal memo-
randaY.2  Since courts are often hesitant to encounter unnecessarily the
doctrine of executive privilege, an inquiry must first be made whether a
document can be withheld under another specific statutory exemption
before a court will consider applying the internal memoranda exemp-
tion.
Areas of Judicial Agreement. It appears well settled that the inter-
nal memoranda exemption must be specifically raised by the agency
wishing to invoke it."5 The court then has the power to decide whether
the material falls within the exemption." If the court lacked this power,
it would quickly become a "mere rubber stamp" for the agencies' con-
clusions.'
Because courts must decide whether material falls within an
exempted class, it was felt until Mink that the only practical method
for making this determination was in camera examination.32 After
Mink's limitation on in camera examination it is uncertain whether such
broad use of this procedure will continue.3 3 However, because the
government continues to bear a heavy burden of proof in showing that
in camera examination is not warranted,34 few instances will arise in
2'Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1971): Consumers Union, Inc. v. VA,
301 F. Supp. 796, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir, 1971).
In determining whether disclosure is required under the FIA, the courts have followed the
traditional treatment of the executive privilege of internal memoranda. Thus they allow purely
factual material to be discovered. However, material of either an advisory or deliberative nature
is exempted from disclosure. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir.
1972): Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580-82 (D.C. Cir.
1970): see 410 U.S. at 86-93. Factual material inextricably intertwined with recommendatory
material is also exempted. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Though the factual material limitation on the interagency memorandum exemption is sound,
a recent note has pointed out that courts have too often exercised the limitation without looking
at the underlying policies. While the results may often be the same, the method of arriving at those
results would be more rational and understandable as precedent if the appropriate factors were
brought out into public view. Note, 86 HARV. L. REV., supra note 22, at 1052-57.
-,Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
!'Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1971); GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878. 879
(9th Cir. 1969).
'Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 703-04 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
3'S. REP. 8; H. REP. 9.
=Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); see
text accompanying note 15 supra.
See note 15 supra.
"
1Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 71-1026 at 8 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 28, 1973);
[Vol. 52
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which the courts will refuse such an examination.
In order to fulfill the purpose of full disclosure, courts have ex-
cerpted factual material from documents which were also of an advisory
nature, ' unless fact and opinion were inseparably intertwined.
The exemption can be waived by an agency's actions. This waiver
theory is generally recognized to rest not on the waiver of executive
privilege found in discovery cases but on specific provisions of the FIA
itself.36 For example, the act requires that final opinions of agencies be
disclosed.3 1 If the agency were to base a final opinion solely on an
exempted internal memorandum and that memorandum were allowed
to remain exempted from disclosure, the requirement that final opinions
be disclosed could be defeated.38 Such a condition would allow the
exemption to swallow the act. Therefore, staff opinions that are adopted
as policies or interpretations of law, 11 or as the basis of a final order, 0
or as staff instructions affecting a member of the public" lose their
exempt status. The manner in which the opinions are adopted by the
agency is of no significance.12 Nevertheless, a showing that the informa-
tion offered by the government cannot be fully understood without the
advisory material4 3 or that a portion of the material was disclosed,44
is insufficient for waiver.
Areas of Judicial Disagreement. Prior to Mink a significant body
of inconsistent precedent had been created by lower courts in interpret-
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, Civil No. 841-72 at 2 (D.D.C., June 6, 1973).
21E.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"'See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Mail Line,
Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 701-03 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F.
Supp. 751, 753-54 (D.D.C. 1972). But see GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969).
"5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970).
"At least for purposes of the FIA, an agency's final opinion is not simply a statement that
"X shall do this thing." How much of the agency's reason for the opinion must be included is not
clear, however. Compare American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.
1969) with International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349, 1359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U.S.
827 (1971).
"'5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1970), applied in, GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir.
1969).
"'5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970), applied in, American Mail Lines. Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d
696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1970), applied in, Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp.
751, 754 (D.D.C. 1972).
":GSA v. Benson. 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969).
"International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (2d Cir. 1971).
"Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1972), modifying 341 F.
Supp. 1013 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
1973]
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ing the FIA. s There has been a split of authority on whether courts may
go outside the specific statutory language to determine whether infor-
mation is within the exemption. Some courts have felt that the FIA's
grant of equitable jurisdiction allows them to apply general doctrines of
equity to balance the effects of disclosure against the effects of non-
disclosure on considerations not expressly included in the act.4" Other
courts have felt that the statutory provision which states that the exemp-
tions authorize withholding of information only "as specifically stated
in this section '47 denies a court the power to introduce such general
equitable considerations.48
There has also been considerable disagreement over the criteria to
be used in determining whether material is disclosable. One group of
cases suggests that if any litigational situation can be imagined in which
discovery would be allowed, then disclosure should follow.4" Other
courts take a more restrictive view5 and find support in one version of
the act's legislative history.5
Probably the most important disagreement has concerned whether
the party seeking disclosure must show a need for the material. Some
"SFor example, it had been decided that the portion of the act dealing with its judicial enforce-
ment, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), applies to all sections of the act. American Mail Line, Ltd. v.
Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969). A more limited application for that section had been
prescribed shortly after passage of the act by the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE
PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 15 (1967).
"GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969) (effect on the public is the primary
consideration); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Consumers Union, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
475 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
"Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman v.
N LR B, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1972); Consumer Union,
Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
OWu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1972); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595
(W.D. Wash. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
The Benson court said the government must prove that in routine, but not in all actions,
discovery would be denied. After such proof the claimant must show a situation exists in which
the court should make the information available. 289 F. Supp. at 595.
Additionally, there is a problem based on the difference between the House and Senate
versions of the legislative history. Only the House Report refers to information which could be
"routinely" discovered. Some courts have held that when differences are important, only the
Senate Report should be examined because this report was available to the House and should,
therefore, more accurately reflect a legislative consensus. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 &
n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971); cf. Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968): see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 3A.2 (3d ed. 1972).
•1H. REP. 10.
[Vol. 52
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
early decisions52 were apparently grounded on a belief that the internal
memoranda privilege is based on executive privilege. 3 They stated that
the balancing test used in executive privilege cases should be used in FIA
cases 54 and held that the need of the party seeking disclosure must be
balanced against possible injurious consequences of disclosure to the
executive and to the country. 55
A slightly larger group of cases has held that need is not a criterion
to be considered under a FIA. This line of thought began with a highly
influential article by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis.5 The article was
cited and its reasoning adopted without question in a subsequent group
of cases.57 These cases, in turn, were cited as precedent for later deci-
sions.58 Nevertheless, even the courts following the Davis reasoning have
felt it necessary to examine the availability of alternative means of
gathering the information sought.59
III. EFFECTS OF MINK
The issues that Mink resolved are simply put. The Court approved
disclosure only of factual material that is not inextricably intertwined
with advisory opinions." It held that the internal memoranda exemption
was a limited one which required judicial determination of whether the
exemption had been properly invoked.' It supplied a guideline for what
a court should consider before deciding to conduct an in camera exami-
nation .2
Unfortunately, the case contains contradictory dicta which raise
questions at least as significant as those which it answers. For example,
the Court first states that the act apparently does not permit inquiry into
5
-Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick,
411 F.2d 696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Boeing
Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
"Cases cited notes 50 & 54 supra.
5Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761,795-97 (1967);
see text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
5TSoucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
" Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704-05 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971) (Black, J.).
51E.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1 410 U.S. at 92.
O'ld. at 85-94.
'
2ld. at 93-94; see text accompanying note 15 supra.
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the need of the complainant; 3 yet immediately thereafter it explicitly
assumes "that Congress legislated against the backdrop of this
[discovery] case law . . ." These two statements are in diametrical
opposition. When discovery is sought of documents for which the execu-
tive has raised the internal memoranda privilege, the court decides
whether to grant discovery by balancing the need of the party against
the possible injury to effective governmental operation that disclosure
may cause. 5
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR NEED
As noted above, 66 the concept that the particularized need of the
claimant may not be examined under the FIA arose from an interpreta-
tion given to the act by professor Kenneth Davis. This construction is
based on reading the statutory language that information be made avail-
able to "any person" 6' as removing from consideration such personal-
ized criteria as need. It is argued that additional support is given to this
construction by the impersonal terms of the internal memoranda ex-
emption.
Notwithstanding the reasonableness of this construction, it is nei-
ther the only one which can be given to the statute nor, as Professor
Davis admits, 9 is it the most desirable. The Supreme Court itself balked
at the possibility that a party with no need for the information might
0410 U.S. at 86.
cud. at 88-89, see text accompanying note 3 supra.
It is also worthy of note that the portion of the Court's opinion dealing with in camera
examination of memoranda looks to discovery decisions rather than the more liberal FIA prece-
dent. 410 U.S. at 92-93.
'Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. V. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 331-32 (D.D.C. 1966), affdsub non), V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
"See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
675 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
The statute states that internal memoranda shall not be disclosed if they would not "be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation .. " 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
The argument is that since the Congress chose the words "a party" instead of the more specific
"the party" it must have intended that such personalized aspects of a complaint as need not be
considered. If this interpretation was not followed the information would not be available to "any
person." Davis, supra note 56, at 795-96.
However, it should be observed that the term "any party" was incorporated solely to avoid
the restrictive interpretation given the term "properly and directly concerned" in the APA of 1946.
H. REP. I: S. REP. 7; see text accompanying note 21 supra.
"Davis, supra note 56, at 795-96.
[Vol. 52
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compromise the legitimate policy of fostering staff opinions on contro-
versial issues by forcing even partial disclosure of internal memoranda. 0
There is an even greater danger. If parties with no need for the informa-
tion abuse the liberal spirit of the FIA, courts may interpret the act
more strictly and thus thwart its purpose when disclosure is most sorely
needed.
The answer to this problem may be to read the act as requiring a
showing of need, as was done by some of the early FIA cases." There
are three justifications for such a reading. First, the statutory section
requiring that records be made "available to any person" simply is not
applicable when the courts are considering the disclosure of documents
for which the executive has claimed the internal memoranda privilege.
By the express terms of the statute, "[t]his section does not apply to
matters that are . . . inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-
dums .... ,"72 Secondly, the use of "a party" in the exemption rather
than "the party" was grammatically necessary to make the qualification
that discovery precedent involving litigation between two agencies was
not applicable.73 Moreover, finding the intent of Congress through such
grammatical detail as the choice of an article ignores the universal
recognition that the FIA was not carefully drafted.74 Finally, any other
interpretation aborts the congressional intent that the act not be used
as a substitute for discovery not allowed in litigation. 75 Therefore, it is
most reasonable to construe the FIA to read that internal memoranda
will be disclosed to any party only to the extent such documents would
be disclosed to him through the discovery process were he in litigation
with the agency.71
"0410 U.S. at 92.
"See cases cited note 52 supra.
7'5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) reads in part as follows:
"(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency ....
735 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970) provides, "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency"
are excluded from the operative area of the FIA. (Emphasis supplied.) One may not say "theparty
other than an agency in litigation with the agency" because such a statement is grammatically
incorrect. For the reason why such a ridiculous argument is necessary, see Note, 86 HARV. L. REV.,
supra note 22, at 1050-51.
"1K. DAvis, stpra note 50, at 85-87.
"See authority cited note 22 supra.
,'See H. REP. 9; S. REP. 2. This concept is somewhat akin to the determination by a few courts
that the statute gives the courts a broad general equity jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes
1973]
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V. EFFECTS OF ADOPTING NEED
Adopting the criterion of need in determining the applicability of
the internal memoranda exemption does not remove all uncertainty
from disclosure disputes. The Court has emphatically understated that,
"[i]n many important respects, the rules governing discovery in such
litigation [where internal memoranda and letters are involved] have
remained uncertain from the very beginnings of the Republic."" Fur-
thermore, discovery in such cases is enmeshed with the question of the
scope of executive privilege, a question which has never been answered."
Before deliniating how the principles of discovery should be applied
to an action brought under the FIA, two initial considerations must be
made. First, the positions of the parties in FIA proceedings must be
analogized in some way to the positions of parties in ordinary discovery
proceedings. Often what can be discovered depends upon whether the
government is plaintiff or defendant," party or non-party."0 Secondly,
certain aspects of existing FIA practice will remain unchanged and
other aspects should remain unchanged.
The problem whether the agency should be viewed as plaintiff or
defendant in FIA proceedings seems partially resolved by the statutory
mandate that the agency is to bear the burden of sustaining its action.8"
Thus it should be placed in the most disadvantageous role, usually that
of the plaintiff when seeking to avoid disclosure. 2
The cases on discovery have been largely affected by whether the
government is a party to the litigation. Discovery has been more fre-
46-48 supra. The important difference is that a theory of broad equitable powers is based on an
assumption that the court is granted true equity jurisdiction. However such jurisdiction is not
specifically provided for in the FIA, and no criteria for its exercise are given. By contrast, the
relation between the internal memorandum exemption and discovery precedent is specifically
required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
11410 U.S. at 86.
7 Nor is there likely to be an answer of broad application found in the present controversy
over the Watergate tapes, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Nixon, Misc. No,
47-73 (D.D.C., August 30, 1973), because the Special Prosecutor as a matter of trial tactics
narrowly circumscribed the issues in hopes of improving his position. Brief for Petitioner at 19-
21.
71See cases cited note 82 infra.
"See cases cited notes 83-84 infra.
115 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
"
2Compare United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) and United States
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485, 489-92 (D.N.J. 1960) (U.S. as plaintifi) with United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 12 (1953) and Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (U.S. as defendant).
[Vol. 52
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quently ordered where the government is a party, 3 because in such
cases there are numerous sanctions short of contempt available for
enforcing the court's order.8s In addition, these sanctions have permitted
the court to avoid allowing the government unconscionable advantage
in the suit."
In FIA cases discovery precedent involving the government as a
party to the litigation is most directly in point because the statute man-
dates that information be made available to the complainant as if he
were a party in litigation with the agency. 6 Nonetheless, certain general
principles of the privilege can still be garnered from cases in which the
government was not a party.
Left for resolution is whether applying the full range of prior dis-
covery decisions to FIA proceedings would change the rationale which
the courts have applied. There will be very little change in decisional
criteria. Most FIA decisions comport with discovery decisions or are
based on unique criteria found within the statute itself. For instance,
outside consultants are covered by the internal memoranda privilege.88
The dichotomy of factual and advisory information is found in the
discovery cases 9 as well as in FIA cases.8 In both bodies of precedent
"Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1337-39 (D.C. Cir 1968); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-26 (D.D.C. 1966) (government not a party); see cases cited
note 84 infra (government a party).
K'Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2nd Cir. 1944) (dismissal); United States v. Cotton Valley Opera-
tors Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719, 720 (W.D. La. 1949), aff d mem., 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (dismissal).
United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1944).
-15 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
"'Probably only those decisions based on situations arising after 1958 will be useful. Prior to
that time the government claimed privilege for such documents on the basis of a statutory provi-
sion, the "housekeeping statute," Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 2, 24 Stat. 2. See Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900). In 1958 this section was amended to stop its use as a tool for
avoiding disclosure. Act of August 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958). The section
is now included in the APA as 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
Most courts and authorities have agreed that the amendment removed most of the significance
from cases decided under the statute. Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp.
708, 713 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. 25 F.R.D. 485, 489 (D.N.J.
1960); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2019, at 165 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. But see 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.61 (4.-2)
(2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
mBoeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1960): Cooney v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 716 (E.D. Pa. 1968); see note 26 supra.
This result may be changed to the extent that discovery would not dissuade the consultant
from giving advice in the future. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
"Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall,
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the privilege is a limited one which must be specifically raised,9 and in
both the court is usually called upon92 to decide by in camera examina-
tion93whether the privilege has been properly invoked." In both situa-
tions the court is given discretion to either excerpt unprivileged material
or excise privileged material from the documents under consideration
and to order disclosure or discovery of the unprivileged portions,"
The theory of waiver as delimited in FIA cases must remain un-
changed. FIA waiver is based upon an interpretation of the act which
is independent of analogy to discovery. 6 More importantly, if the waiver
theory of discovery were adopted, the exemption might well be removed
in toto. It is generally agreed that when the government is a defendant
the assertion of executive privilege may be made to avoid discovery."
On the other hand, many discovery cases and commentators agree that
the government, as plaintiff, waives the privilege.98 Since the agency
should be treated as the plaintiff in FIA proceedings,99 the result would
280 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1003,
1006 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 944
(Ct. Cf. 1958).
'See note 26 supra.
"United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 10-11 (1953); see text accompanying note 29 supra.
"-Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 974-48 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
see 410 U.S. at 93-94.
"Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall,
280 F.2d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1003, 1006
(N.D. Ga. 1972); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318,332 (D.D.C. 1966);
see text accompanying note 32 supra.
"Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1966); Machin v.
Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see text accompanying note 30 supra.
95Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall,
280 F.2d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485, 491-
92 (D.N.J. 1960); see text accompanying note 31 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 36-41 supra.
"United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-8, 11 (1953); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 944-47 (Ct. Cl. 1958); MOORE 26.61 (6.-4); WRIGHT & MILLER
§ 2019, at 173-74.
There is some authority that consent to being sued waives the privilege. Bank Line, Ltd. v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
"United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506, (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Gates, 35
F.R.D. 524, 529 (D.C. Colo. 1964); United States v. Continental Can Co., 22 F.RD. 241, 245
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). But see Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879,
891-892 (1962); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485, 492 (D.N.J. 1960).
This is of course based in part on the practical consideration that there are sanctions short of
contempt available. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
"See text accompanying note 82 supra.
Contempt is specifically provided as the sanction in FIA proceedings. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(3)
(1970). There is a limited sanction available for violation of § 552(a)(2), which is not applicable
here.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
be an automatic waiver of the exemption if discovery precedent on
waiver applied. Thus the discovery precedent seems not only inappro-
priate but also outside of congressional intent. Congress would hardly
have listed the exemption only to waive it in the same sentence. This is
but another example of the poor drafting and lack of forethought that
is found throughout the FIA.
VI. Quo VADIS?
In summary, if the full range of discovery criteria ia applied to the
internal memoranda exemption,' 0 three consequences are clear. First,
the government will be regarded as if it were the party plaintiff seeking
to avoid discovery in litigation.'0 ' Secondly, most of the decisional cri-
teria used in present FIA cases to determine what information is disclos-
able will remain unchanged.'0 2 Finally, the present doctrine of waiver
under the internal memoranda exemption rather than waiver as used in
discovery should continue to be applied to FIA cases. 03 Thus it appears
that the major change caused by adopting the full body of discovery law
into FIA proceedings is that the need of the party becomes a relevant
criterion in the decision.'0 '
The recent revision of the federal civil discovery rules which re-
moved need from consideration in Rule 34 has not changed this factor
in cases involving executive privilege. As the Advisory Committee
pointed out, "Protection may be afforded to claims of privacy or secrecy
or of undue burden . . . under what is now Rule 26(c). .. "1I05 Rule
26 sets the scope of discovery and provides protection from abuse. To
be discoverable, a document must be "not privileged."'' 10 Because a
showing of need is required to remove the information from the asserted
privilege, need was not dispensed with by the change in the Rules.' 7
"~See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
t'See text accompanying notes 81-87 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 88-95 supra.
1"See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
'United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,11 (1953); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d
654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
1'5FED. R. Civ. P. 34, Notes of the Advisory Comm. on Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1973).
" "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged . "FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1).
"'WRIGHT & MILLER § 2019, at 164; MOORE 26.61 (6.-4); see Committee for Nuclear
Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 436 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Simons-Eastern Co. v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1003, 1005-06 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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Although some courts have held that a document remains privi-
leged if its disclosure would be injurious to the public interest,,"3 most
courts have balanced the possible injury to governmental operations
against the need of the particular litigant.' 9 A major problem is that
no court has defined "need." The best that can be gleaned from the
cases is some of the factors that a court will consider in determining
whether need exists, whatever it is. Need depends not only upon whether
the party is plaintiff or defendant, but also upon whether there are
alternative sources of information available,"10 whether the government
has offered the information in another form"' and upon the degree of
diligence the party seeking discovery has shown in attempting to obtain
the information either from the government or from alternative
sources."
2
The Freedom of Information Act requires that the courts exercise
a Solomonic wisdom to respect the need of a free citizenry for informa-
'E.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 944-46 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
"'United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d
654, 662 (DC. Cir. 1960).
"'United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); Freeman v. Seligson,405 F.2d 1326, 1336-
37 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"'United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3, 11 (1953); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339-
41 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"'Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 328 (D.D.C. 1966).
At this point analysis approaches a full scale discussion of the executive privilege . . . and
stops. The executive privilege is a perfect circle with no beginning and no end, the latter of which
this note must have. The Supreme Court is not itself clear as to the definition and extent of the
privilege. Compare United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34-38 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D Va. 1807)
and United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191-93 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807) with Mississippi
v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475,499-501 (1867). Compare Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) and New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
727-730 (1971) with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Two brief quotations illuminate the policies in issue.
Free and open comments on the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed course
of governmental management would be adversely affected if the civil servant or executive
assistant were compelled by publicity to bear the blame for errors or bad judgment
properly chargeable to the responsible individual with power to decide and act.
Justice Reed in Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 945-46 (Ct.
Cl. 1958) (Sitting as Emergency Judge).
A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it,
is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives
9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt Ed. 1910).
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tion and at the same time protect the institutions of government from
exposure which might render them disfunctional. May they be granted
greater wisdom than mortal men.
W. G. CHAMPION MITCHELL
Constitutional Law-School Desegregation-De Facto Hangs On
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,' a case involving the Denver
schools, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion that differs strik-
ingly from earlier desegregation rulings. All prior high court decisions
dealt with Southern school systems with long histories of legally en-
forced segregation. This sort of segregation, termed dejure segregation,
was ordered eliminated "root and branch"'2 and was the target of the
Court's far-reaching order in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education . Since such state-ordered segregation was never present
in Denver, Keyes was viewed as the first opportunity for the Court to
confront the question of de facto segregation,4 segregation supposedly
brought about by "neutral" factors such as residence.5
The cases following Brown v. Board of Education6 did not question
the constitutional mandate to eliminate segregation, but instead consid-
ered what remedies were appropriate for dismantling dual systems.
Keyes largely ignores the remedy question7 and returns to an earlier
stage in analysis of school problems to consider under what conditions
a federal court may act at all in a school case.
The return to consideration of the constitutional right involved was
accompanied by a further deterioration of the Court's unanimity in
school cases. From Brown to Swann, all such cases were handed down
'93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973). The prior reported opinions in this case may be found at 303 F. Supp.
279 (D. Colo. 1969) (preliminary injunction); 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969) (supplemental
findings); 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) (opinion on the merits); 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970)
(opinion on remedies); 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971) (affirmed in part and reversed.in part); 396
U.S. 1215 (1969) (order of Brennan, J. reinstating a preliminary injunction); 402 U.S. 182 (1971)
(per curiam order vacating stay entered by the court of appeals before Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), was decided).
2Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
'402 U.S. 1 (1971).
'93 S. Ct. at 2701.
5Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF.
L. REv. 275, 276 n.6 (1972).
-347 U.S. 483 (1954), implemented 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
'This note will also limit its scope to the constitutional right involved in school desegregation.
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by a unanimous court.' But, in two cases during the past two terms
dealing tangentially with this issue, the Court split badly.' In Keyes, the
first non-unanimous case concerned only with school desegregation,
only four justices joined the Court's opinion, although three of the
remaining four justices (Mr. Justice White did not take part) concurred
in the result.
THE DENVER CASE
The first black residential area of Denver, the "Five Points" or core
city area, had largely been segregated since before Brown.'" During the
late 1950's and 1960's, the expansion of the black community eastward
along a narrow corridor resulted in the segregation of the adjacent area
of Park Hill." Several local committees that had studied the problem
of equal opportunity in the Denver schools recommended action to
integrate the schools in these two communities. In May 1964, the school
board adopted a policy favoring integration, but failed to take any
action. Indeed, through the use of shifting attendance zones, mobile
classrooms, student transfer plans, and other devices, the school board
was actually maintaining racially separated schools. In particular, con-
struction of Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area and the
drafting of its attendance lines purposely established a new all-black
school at a time when white schools in the area were severely over-
crowded.' 2
In response to this situation and to black protests, the Denver
board in 1969 passed three resolutions designed to establish at each
Park Hill school a student body that would be approximately eighty per
cent white. After a school board election in which these resolutions were
an issue, the new board rescinded the earlier actions and went back to
the old attendance zones and a voluntary transfer program.,3 At that
point, the Keyes suit was filed.
After an extensive trial," the district court found that the schools
'E.g.. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
'Richmond School Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973) (equally divided Court
allirming court of appeals per curiam); Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (5-4
decision).
"1303 F. Supp. at 282.
11Id.
"-313 F. Supp. at 64-65.
"Id. at 66.
"The trial lasted fourteen days and involved several hundred exhibits and two thousand pages
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in both the core city and Park Hill areas were racially imbalanced.'5 It
further found that the board's actions created de jure segregation in
relation to the Park Hill schools, and it accordingly ordered remedial
action for Park Hill." However, the court insisted that the plaintiffs
make a separate showing of de jure segregative acts and intent to segre-
gate for each area that they wished to have integrated. The court then
held that the plaintiffs had not met that burden with respect to the core
city area. 7
Although refusing to order integration on the basis of segregated
conditions, the district court found that the core city schools were in-
ferior. Applying the "separate but equal" standard espoused in Plessy
v. Ferguson,8 the court held that the school board had a minimum duty
to maintain schools of equal quality throughout the district. Since the
court found that that goal could only be reached through integration,
the court ordered the formulation of a desegregation plan for the core
city schools." Upon appeal by both the board and the plaintiffs, the
of testimony. 313 F. Supp. at 63.
15This presents a definitional problem. Denver is a tri-ethnic city. Overall, the school popula-
tion is 60% white, 20% Hispano, and 14% black. The difficulty arises in deciding whether the
Hispano students should be counted separately or with the black students. The district court used
a standard separating black and Hispano students. The Supreme Court ruled that both minorities
should be counted together, and that the district court should consider racial composition of
faculties and staffs in identifying segregated schools. In addition, community attitudes towards the
schools should be examined. Yet beyond this list of factors, the Court gave no clear guidelines for
determining whether a school is segregated. 93 S. Ct. at 2691-92.
The Court has often failed in this manner to define adequately the terms that it uses. Neither
dual nor unitary school systems have been meaningfully defined. For that matter, exact definitions
ofdejure and de facto segregation have never been stated. Indeed Keyes may have further obscured
their meaning. The Court is not wholly at fault for this situation. These concepts are slippery at
best, and exact definition for all circumstances may be impossible. Yet the current ambiguity
creates problems for judges trying to apply the Court's mandates to new situations. Cf. Craven,
Integrating the Desegregation Vocabulary-Brown Rides North, Maybe, 73 W. VA. L. REv. I
(1971).
1303 F. Supp. at 296 (preliminary injunction); 313 F. Supp. at 83-84 (final order).
17313 F. Supp. at 69-77
"163 U.S. 587 (1896).
11313 F. Supp. at 96-97. This use of Plessy by the district court is part of a minor revival of
interest in the case. It is seen as furnishing a standard for school board conduct in areas where
actual physical integration may be impossible. This view was given its most important statement
by Judge J. Skelly Wright.
Nevertheless, to the extent the Plessy rule, as strictly construed in cases like Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,. . is a reminder of the responsibility entrusted to the courts
for insuring that disadvantaged minorities receive equal treatment when the crucial right
to public education is concerned, it can validly claim ancestry for the modern rule [equal
educational opportunity] the court here recognizes.
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496-97 (D.D.C.1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
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Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court order as it applied to Park Hill,
but held that there was no basis for ordering integration of the core city
and reversed that part of the district court's decision.2 1
KEYES IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court, hearing the case on certiorari, affirmed the
findings and order below concerning the Park Hill schools.2' However,
it established a different standard to be applied to the core city schools
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, 2 the Court continued to
adhere to a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. To
obtain relief, plaintiffs in a school action must not only show segrega-
tion, but "also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional
state action. 12 3 In other words, a Northern plaintiff must show that the
school board has created by its actions the sort of de jure segregation
banned in the South by Brown and subsequent cases.
The Court never questioned that the plaintiffs met this burden with
respect to the Park Hill schools. Generally, a showing of a statutorily
segregated system in effect in 1954 will be sufficient to obtain relief
covering the entire district.24 However, where this showing cannot be
made, as in Denver, a finding of intentional segregation in just one part
of a school system, albeit a substantial part, will not alone satisfy the
plaintiff's burden with respect to the entire district.25 The Court did
recognize, though, "that racially inspired school board actions have an
impact beyond the particular schools that are the subjects of those
actions. 26 Accordingly, Keyes established a presumption that substan-
tial segregation in one part of a school district has a segregatory effect
upon the entire district and thus creates an unconstitutional dual school
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted); see Gomperts v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237, 1239-
40 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971); Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1030-31 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
-'Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
2193 S. Ct. 2686 (1973).
2'Justice Brennan was writing for himself and Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun,
Justice Douglas joined the Court while writing a separate opinion. Chief Justice Burger concurred
in the result only, and Justice Powell joined the result while dissenting from the Court's opinion
(Justice Douglas also joined Powell's dissent). Justice Rehnquist also dissented.
293 S. Ct. at 2692.
211d. at 2693-94.
-1d.
"Id. at 2695.
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system. The defendant school board may rebut this presumption, how-
ever, by showing that the district is divisible so that acts in one part did
not so affect the entire district as to create segregation throughout. 17
The opinion seemed to indicate that a finding of a dual system
would be dispositive for the entire Denver school system. However, the
Court went on to establish a further analysis of the problem of the core
city schools. This would be applied in the event that the trial court does
not find a dual system. Both inferior courts had demanded a separate
showing of de jure segregation in the core city, a demand that the
plaintiffs did not meet.21 Under the Supreme Court's formulation, the
essential factor for a finding of de jure segregation is intent to segregate.
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between dejure segrega-
tion and so-called de facto segregation .. . is purpose or intent to
segregate.'2 9 Thus even if the board's acts caused segregation, without
segregative intent behind those actions, there is no occasion for a court's
intervention.3
Where the plaintiffs have shown, as in Denver, that a substantial
portion of the district was intentionally segregated, the Court held that
this "creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the
system is not adventitious." '31 The board must then show that the other
segregation is not the result of its intentional acts.
The board has two ways to meet this burden. First, it may attempt
to show that its actions were not taken with segregative intent. This
cannot be satisfied by mere reliance on a neutral theory to explain their
actions; "[t]heir burden is to adduce proof sufficient to support a finding
that segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their
actions. '32 Alternatively, the board may present evidence to show that
their actions neither caused nor contributed to the segregation that
exists. In other words, they may show that the segregated conditions are
truly de facto. 33
In summary, a plaintiff must show at a minimum, de jure acts
resulting in segregation affecting a "substantial" portion of the students
in a school system. The court will then decide whether the entire system
Id. A finding of a dual system will immediately end further analysis. The sole remaining
question will be the remedy to be ordered.
21445 F.2d at 1005-06.
293 S. Ct. at 2697.
111d. at 2699 n.17.
3'd. at 2697.
3'ld. at 2698.
3ld. at 2699.
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is thus a dual system, requiring affirmative action to eliminate segrega-
tion. If it is not, then segregative intent of the board regarding the rest
of the district must be shown, but the presumption is against the board.
They may rebut it by a showing of no segregative intent or that their
acts had no part in creating the segregated conditions. The Court very
carefully did not rule on whether a neighborhood school policy evenly
applied would justify resulting racial imbalances."
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE KEYES STANDARD
Several problems may be noted with the Court's formulation. To
begin with, the facts in Denver, which made the decision an easy one,
may not be representative. In the Park Hill area, there was a long
history of segregative acts taken over the loud protests of the black
community. There was no doubt that these acts constituted a pattern
of de jure segregation. 5 In another city however, it might prove consid-
erably more difficult to make the required showing of substantial dejure
segregation. Given the uncertain meaning of the terms used here,36 a
court might easily find for the school board, even on similar facts.
Along with the possibilities of uneven application, litigation under
the Keyes rule is likely to be both lengthy and difficult. Courts will have
to consider and evaluate tremendous amounts of data and numerous
actions over an extensive period. The difficulties involved just in the
initial de jure showing (certainly a simpler task than determining intent
or causation over an entire district) have been noted in a comment on
the district court decision:
As to causation, the plaintiff cannot reasonably be required to
show that the present stage of segregation is the direct and proximate
result of any past state action. This concept of causation presents
almost insurmountable problems in relatively simple tort suits. It be-
comes totally unmanageable when applied to anything so complex as
the myriad social forces which go into the determination of racial
housing patterns. 37
Extended litigation will not only tie up court time and provide numerous
avenues of delay but may also discourage possible plaintiffs unwilling
311d.
3See Comment, Equal Protection-School Desegregation-Keyes v. School District Null-
her One, 48 DENVER L.J. 417, 422 (1972).
'See note 15 supra.
'Comment, 48 DENVER L.J., supra note 35 at 437-38.
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to begin such a potentially arduous process.3
The Keyes decision continues to establish a different standard for
Northern and Southern school districts. In the South, a plaintiff need
only "prove that a current condition of segregated schooling exists
within a school district where a dual system was compelled or author-
ized . ..at the time of our decision in Brown v. Board. . . .39 A
Northern system, even where the factual condition of segregation is
identical, has the opportunity of denying responsibility or intent, and
thus preventing any integrative action by the courts. This differing re-
gional standard has been the subject of much criticism," and the use of
the Brown decision (May 17, 1954) as the dividing point seems particu-
larly unfounded. As one authority has noted, the three major cases
where courts of appeals have denied relief in de facto situations all arose
from school districts which were segregated by statute prior to Brown,
one of them until 1954.11
It is difficult to perceive the justification for the Court's double
standard, particularly since a state prior to Brown reasonably could
have believed that Plessy was good law,4" and since the relationship
between the practices of twenty years ago and the situation now is often
tenuous. Given the sensitivity of this issue, the Court may be fueling
Southern resentment of court-ordered integration plans by seemingly
continuing to discriminate in espousing two different regional tests for
what is now a national problem.
"A reply that earlier suits were also lengthy is not entirely apposite. In a Southern suit, there
may be great delay, but there is also great certainty that some relief will result from the effort. In
Northern suits, no such certainty can exist.
1193 S. Ct. at 2693.
10See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Signifigance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 697, 699-705 (1971); Goodman, supra note 5, at 296.
"Goodman, supra note 5, at 297. The three cases are Deal v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 55
(6th Cir. 1966). cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967) (Cincinnati, Ohio); Downs v. Board of Educ.,
336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965) (Kansas City, Kan.); Bell v. School
City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) (Gary, Ind.); cf. Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 380 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). But see Springfield
School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 .2d 261 (lst Cir. 1965).
'
2The argument that a pre-1954 termination of segregation evinces a good faith effort to
desegregate would seem to be weakened by the suits in those districts demanding that segregation
there be ended in fact, as well as in law. Also, particularly with systems ending segregation just
prior to Brown, an assumption of good faith on their part, and of bad faith on the part of others
not taking the same step until after Brown, without further examination of the respective boards'
later records, would seem unwarranted.
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INTENT AS A TEST
Perhaps the weakest point of the Keyes holding is the Court's
reliance on the school board's intent. 3 In using intent, the Court both
complicates desegregation litigation and seems to reverse a long-
established method of viewing school segregation problems.
Brown v. Board appeared to hold as an evidentiary presumption
that segregated schools are by that fact detrimental.44 If segregation
creates inherently unequal educational opportunities, the purest motives
of school board members will scarcely alleviate its impact; nor will
children in segregated schools that were created adventitiously be any
better off than those in schools, such as Park Hill in Denver, where
intent can be shown. If it bears no relationship to the problem, why must
intent be a required element of a plaintiff's case?
In earlier cases, the Court has steadfastly refused to examine the
intent of a local board and instead has emphasized the effects of local
actions. Green v. County School Board45 and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education" insisted that integration take place
in fact and that a plan that actually works be formulated; the board's
intentions were not relevant. In Wright v. City of Emporia, the Court
examined the effects of new school district lines and rejected a "domi-
nant purpose" determination as a test in school cases.47 "Thus we have
focused upon the effect-not the purpose or motivation-of a school
board's action in determining whether it is a permissible method of
dismantling a dual system."4
Recently the Fifth Circuit has strongly supported the position of
ignoring intent,49 and the Tenth Circuit which decided Keyes, stated in
"The use of segregatory intent here can be seen as a substitute for the statutory de jure
segregation heretofore required in showing the board's responsibility for segregated conditions.
"There has been a tremendous amount of dispute over this, much of it unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Goodman, supra note 5, at 277-78. The central issue seems to be how much reliance the Court
placed on the sociological data it cited, 347 U.S. at 494 n.l 1, much of which is now suspect. The
opinion in Brown at no point relies on this data, which appears in only one footnote.
Since then, the Court has never questioned the harmful effects of segregation, nor has it shown
any signs that it is about to. Suffice it to say that under current doctrine (including Keyes) a
plaintiff has shown detriment by showing segregation. Cf. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School
Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 3052 (1973).
402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).
391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
7407 U.S. 451, 460-62 (1972).
1Id. at 462.
"Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane),
cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 3052 (1973).
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a case involving the related area of segregated public housing that "[I]f
the proof of a civil right [sic] violation depends on an open statement
by an official of an intent to discriminate, the Fourteenth Amendment
offers little solace to those seeking its protection."50 Keyes now ignores
this approach to delve into the subjective intent of a local board.5,
POWELL'S DISSENT-A UNIFORM APPROACH
Although concurring in the result, Justices Douglas and Powell
dissented from the doctrine established by the Court.52 They insist that
one standard is needed for all school suits,
[I]f our national concern is for those who attend such segregated
schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the evil of operating
separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta. 3
Justice Powell argued that the imposition of an affirmative duty to
integrate urban districts requires "these districts to alleviate conditions
which in large part did not result from historic state-imposed de jure
segregation."54 If the Court then wishes to order urban integration in
both North and South, it must find a new standard.
To formulate a proper test, the dissent, relying on Green and
Swann, defined the right involved as "the right, derived from the Equal
Protection Clause to expect that once the State has assumed responsibil-
ity for education, local boards will operate- integrated school systems
within their respective districts." 5 A court, in determining whether a
school board has acted to achieve an integrated system will examine the
effect of past actions in fulfilling the duty to desegregate. Among the
characteristics that would mark an integrated system are integrated
"ODailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970); cf. Gautreux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I11. 1969), affd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970). Contra,
Thompson v. Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
"This is no easy task. In any school suit, the acts complained of will have taken place over a
long period, during which the school board is likely to have changed membership many times.
Arriving at a finding over the entire period may be impossible. The search is further complicated
by the fact that the members may all have had differing reasons for taking a given action. Inferring
a unified intent cannot realistically produce a result consistent with the realities of the board's
decision-making process.
12Since Justice Douglas' one page opinion covers much the same ground, this note will focus
on Justice Powell's longer dissent.
"93 S. Ct. at 27,02-03 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
"ld. at 2704.
"Id. at 2706 (footnotes omitted).
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faculties; equality in facilities, equipment and curriculum; and atten-
dance zoning and school construction designed to maximize integrative
opportunities."
In assessing the duty of a school board, Justice Powell introduced
an evidentiary presumption similar to Brown's that segregated schools
are unequal.57 Given the overall authority that a school board has over
the school system, the presence of substantial segregation is "prima
facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible school
board." 8 Although the presence of other factors affecting segregation
is admitted, this holding establishes the presumption that state action
is responsible in some degree for school conditions.
59
Once such a prima facie case is established, Powell argued that the
board may rebut it by showing that they have, in fact, operated an
integrated system in line with the characteristics delineated above."
Failing that, a court must order affirmative action to integrate the
system."
Powell's suggested test is likely the simplest that we shall see in this
area. 2 It concentrates on ascertainable facts rather than subjective in-
tent. It places responsibility for the schools on the school board not by
a complex factual determination of the causes of residential segregation,
wId.
5See text accompanying note 44, supra.
"193 S. Ct. at 2707, 2711.
"'Although there is much evidence to support such a presumption, the limits of social science
evidence often prevent conclusively proving the board's responsibility. For a long discussion of the
evidentiary problems inherent in approaching de facto segregation, see Goodman, supra note 5, at
298-374.
093 S. Ct. at 2711.
"The second half of Justice Powell's opinion discusses the available remedies in school cases.
93 S. Ct. at 2711-20. While not absolutely forbidding the use of busing as a tool, he would avoid
it, particularly for elementary school children, in all but the most extreme cases. Advocating
greater emphasis on factors such as neighborhood schools in creating an equitable remedy, he is
linally forced to rely on the good faith of the local boards. The record in the South would suggest
that this position is rather naive, but a full discussion of this part of the dissent is beyond the scope
of this note.
"
2A number of other approaches to de facto segregation have been suggested, most of them
compatible with, but not identical to, the standards suggested in the Keyes dissent. See, e.g., Fiss,
supra note 40: Goodman, supra note 5; Silard, Toward Nationwide School Desegregation: A
"Compelling State Interest" Test of Racial Concentration in Public Education, 51 N. C. L. REV.
675 (1973); Note, Demise of the Neighborhood School Plan, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 594 (1970).
Comment, 48 DENVER L.J., supra note 35: Note, De Facto School Segregation and the "State
Action" Requirement. A Suggested New Approach, 48 IND. L.J. 304 (1973); Comment, School
Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 421
(1972).
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but by a recognition that, as the agency best able to affect the schools,
the board had a significant role in determining how they are operated.
It is a standard that can fairly be applied to any region of the country.
Justice Powell recognized that integration nationwide is a goal that will
be reached eventually, and he proposes a test best designed to achieve
that purpose.
CONCLUSIONS
Keyes presents two differing approaches to the school desegrega-
tion problem;13 the Court is cautiously moving forward while adhering
to the de facto/de jure distinction, and the dissenters are abandoning it
for a uniform national standard. By moving slowly, the Court may have
created many new problems of sectional discrimination, opportunities
for delay, and difficulty for plaintiffs.
Arguably, the Court is in a dangerous political situation with re-
gard to school desegregation.64 By acting cautiously, with minimum
doctrinal expansion, the Court may be attempting to deflate public
resistance. This may be desirable, but the general public likely does not
know or care about the doctrine behind a school desegregation order;
instead it is interested in its effects upon the schools.
Despite the difficulty, many plaintiffs will still prevail under the
Keyes standard. Once a trend is established, other Northern school
boards may be come convinced of the futility of resistance and agree to
integrate. This may accordingly reduce the effects of the difficulties in
the Court's standard. Experience has not provided much evidence to
support this hypothesis. Indeed, for an elected school board to take such
actions may be political suicide. In Denver, those board members sup-
porting the resolutions integrating Park Hill without a court order were
defeated in the next election. 5 Unfortunately, Northern aquiescence will
not solve the school integration problem by itself.
One may also speculate that the Court does not intend for Keyes
=Justice Rehnquist presents a third view in his dissent. 93 S. Ct. at 2720. In essence, he feels
that the rest of the Court has moved too far, and he objects to the inferences against the board
that they announce. He would seem to require a showing of specific de jure acts for each area
concerned before ordering relief. Since all of the other participating Justices agreed that at least
some extension of the desegregation standards should occur, it seems safe to assume that Rehnqu-
ist's approach will remain his alone.
6 A recent Gallup poll shows that only five percent of Americans favor busing as an integrative
tool, although a majority still support integration in principle. N.Y. Times, September 9, 1973,
§ I. at 55, col. 3.
1313 F. Supp. at 66.
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to be a lasting formulation. Brennan's opinion may be just a first step
towards eventual adoption of a standard similar to that espoused by
Justices Douglas and Powell. The possibility that Keyes will not be the
lasting standard is increased by the fact that only four justices joined in
the opinion and that the views of two other justices, Burger and White,
are not known at all. However, if the four justices joining the Keyes
opinion do not change their position, it is difficult to conceive of the
other five being able to concur in any one new standard.
At this writing, the Court has accepted no major school cases for
its October 1973 docket. 6 It seems likely that the Court will wait until
the effects of Keyes can be known before moving significantly further.
Keyes has left the Court sorely divided in an area where it has been the
clear leader in forcing change and is now acting almost alone.67 The
decision has done little to clear up the growing confusion about what
standard of conduct a school board must adhere to. It is incumbent
upon the Court, it if wishes to maintain the process begun twenty years
ago in Brown, to decide what the constitutional right to integrated
schools is, what standard will determine that right, and how the goal of
equal educational opportunity is to be achieved.
JACK GOODMAN
Criminal Procedure-Eighth Amendment Proportionality
Analysis In Its Infancy
In Hart v. Coiner,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed a life sentence imposed under West Virginia's habitual offender
"Petition for certiorari has been filed in the Detroit case, where de jure segregation was found.
The central question there is not the existence of actionable segregation, but whether a metropoli-
tan area wide plan may be ordered in a situation where integrating within the central school district
alone, would have little effect. Bradley v. Milliken, No. 72-1809 (6th Cir., June 12, 1973) (en bane);
petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1973) (No. 73-475).
The Court recently declined to hear two other Northern school cases involving allegedly de
jure acts. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S.
Ct. 3066 (1973) (Indianapolis, Ind.); Davis v. School District, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 913 (1971) (Pontiac, Mich.).
6 There may be some Congressional input forthcoming. In particular this would concern
remedies, one proposal being similar to the approach suggested by Justice Powell see Preyer,
Beyond Desegregation-What Ought to be Done?, 51 N.C.L. REv. 657 (1973).
'No. 71-1885 (4th Cir., July 13, 1973). The case was argued by two third-year law students
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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statute,2 holding that it was "constitutionally excessive and wholly dis-
proportionate to the nature of the offenses . ..committed, and not
necessary to achieve any legitimate legislative purpose."'3 This case
Marks the first time that a federal court has attempted to set forth in a
systematic fashion objective criteria for analyzing the proportionality of
punishment to crime under the eighth amendment.4 Although the deci-
sion is an important step forward, uncertainty persists in the application
of this theory because of the court's failure to justify explicitly the
criteria that it used and because of the United States Supreme Court's
scarce and somewhat uncertain precedent in this area.
THE DECISION
Petitioner Dewey Hart was convicted of perjury in a West Virginia
court for testimony that he had given at his son's murder trial. Before
the court sentenced him, the state filed an information charging him
with being an habitual offender on the basis of two prior felony convic-
tions5- one in 1949 for writing a check for fifty dollars on insufficient
funds and the other in 1955 for transporting a forged check worth 140
dollars across state lines. Following a jury finding that Hart had vio-
lated the recidivist statute, the trial judge imposed the mandatory life
sentence required by the stature.' After Hart had unsuccessfully sought
post-conviction relief in the state courts, 7 he applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court, again without success.' From the order
denying the writ, he appealed to the Fourth Circuit.9
Before reaching the eighth amendment issue, Judge Craven, writing
for the majority, rejected the petitioner's contentions that (1) he was
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966).
'No. 71-1885 at 17.
'Many commentators had previously bemoaned the lack of attention given by the courts to
the application of the proportionality theory. See, e.g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the
Crine, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1074-75 (1964); Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punish-
nent: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972); Note, The
Efrletiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36
N.Y.U.L. REV. 846, 848 (1961); Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-
Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996 (1964).
sWest Virginia's recidivist statute imposes a mandatory life sentence on anyone convicted of
three separate offenses "punishable by confinement in a penitentiary." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-
11-18 (1966).
'No. 72-1885 at 2-4.
Yd at 2.
'Id.
Old.
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denied effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea
to the 1949 bad check charge 10 and that (2) the guilty plea in the 1949
case was unduly coerced." The court then faced the eighth amendment
issue and found that, although the West Virginia habitual offender stat-
ute was valid on its face and had been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court against due process and equal protection attacks,"
Hart's eighth amendment challenge was not foreclosed." The peti-
tioner, rather than attacking the statute itself, argued that the "recidivist
mandatory life sentence in this case"'' 4 was disproportionate to his offen-
ses and therefore in violation of the eighth amendment. 5
Turning to a proportionality analysis, the court noted that while the
theory's validity was well settled under the Supreme Court's decision in
Weems v. United States6 and its own decision in Ralph v. Warden,7
its application was difficult because its meaning is drawn from "'the
"Id. at 4-5 n.2. Even though this issue is beyond the scope of this note, it does merit brief
observation. Had the majority reached an opposite result on this issue, the eighth amendment
inquiry would have been precluded. Id. at 26 (Boreman, J., dissenting). In the court's eagerness to
reach the eighth amendment question, it might have limited well-established Fourth Circuit preced-
ent that late appointment of counsel is so inherently prejudicial as to constitute a prima facie case
of denial of effective assistance of counsel. Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 1970);
Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1967); Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670, 673 (4th
Cir. 1967); Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d 549, 551-52 (4th Cir. 1966); see Jones v. Cunningham,
313 F.2d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1963). The court in Hart asserted that the state rebutted this presump-
tion because the record showed that the defendant "admitted his guilt to his attorney," who in turn
advised him that he "'didn't have to plead guilty.'" No. 71-1885 at 4 n.2. However, Judge
Boreman noted that Hart told his attorney only that he was guilty because his name was on the
check, unaware that proof of several other elements was necessary for conviction of the crime
charged. Id. at 24-25 (dissenting opinion). Furthermore, the attorney failed to investigate the
validity of the prior conviction on which the 1949 recidivist charge was based. Id. at 25, On the
basis of precedent, the dissent appears to be sound. See Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 628-29
(4th Cir. 1967) (defendant was prejudiced by late appointment of counsel because his attorney did
not inquire into whether the defendant had committed all of the elements of the crime); Martin v.
Virginia, 365 F.2d 549, 552-53 (4th Cir. 1966) (attorney failed to consider whether the offense
charged was a misdemeanor rather than a felony and whether he should have requested a change
of venue); Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347, 351-52 (4th Cir. 1963) (attorney must pursue
avenues of defense, even after defendant tells him he is guilty).
"No. 71-1885 at 5 n.2.
12Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (due process); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616
(1912) (equal protection.) In response to the argument that the statute on its face inflicted cruel
and unusual punishment, Graham replied simply: "Nor can it be maintained that cruel and unusual
punishment has been inflicted." 224 U.S. at 631. This statement was not mentioned in Hart.
"
3No. 71-1885 at 5-6. But see id. at 27-28 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
151d.
"-217 U.S. 349 (1910) (the landmark case first espousing the proportionality theory).
17438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970).
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evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society' .. ."I' The court therefore set forth "several objective fac-
tors" to aid in its measurement of proportionality. The test employed
was a "cumulative one focusing on an analysis of the combined fac-
tors."' 9
The first objective factor examined by the court was the nature of
the offense itself with particular attention given to whether it involved
elements of violence or danger to a victim. Applying this criterion the
court found that none of the petitioner's offenses "involved violence or
danger of violence toward persons or property," and moreover that
there were mitigating circumstances in two of Hart's offenses .2 At his
son's murder trial Hart was faced with the moral dilemma of deciding
whether to tell the truth or to protect his son. In considering the 1949
conviction the court emphasized that had the face amount of the bad
check been a penny less, Hart could not have been given a life sentence."
The second objective factor employed by the court was the legisla-
tive purpose of the punishment.22 In response to the state's claim that
the recidivist statute's purpose was one of deterrence, the court stated
that a life sentence was "unnecessary to accomplish the legislative pur-
pose to protect society from an individual who has committed three
wholly nonviolent crimes over a period of twenty years" and was unnec-
essary to deter others "except on the theory that more is better. 2 3
The third criterion adopted was a comparison of the punishment
imposed to those that the petitioner could have received in other juris-
dictions. 24 The court found that the recidivist scheme in West Virginia
"is among the top four in the nation in terms of severity. 2 5 The court
gave particular attention to those ten states allowing a discretionary life
KNo. 71-1885 at 9 quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
"No. 71-1885 at 9.
2Ofd. at 10
21ld. at 3 n.I, 10. Passing a bad check of less than fifth dollars is punishable by confinement
in the county jail and not in a penitentiary. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-39 (1966). Thus, he would
have been exposed only to the possibility of an extra five year sentence as a second offender. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1968).
r-No. 71-1885 at 11-13 The court adopted Justice Brennan's view: "If there is a significantly
less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, ...
the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
279 (1972) (citations omitted).
"No. 71-1885 at 13.
"Id. at 13-15.
"ld. at 14.
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sentence after three felony convictions. Since the provisions in these
jurisdictions provide for judicial consideration of the nature of the un-
derlying offenses, it appeared very unlikely that a sentencing judge
would have given life imprisonment to a petitioner in Hart's situation.
The final criterion utilized by the court was a comparison of the
punishment to punishments allowable for other crimes in the sentencing
jurisdiction.26 The court discovered that life imprisonment was available
in West Virginia only for conviction of first-degree murder, rape, and
kidnapping and that for other "grave crimes of violence" such as
second-degree murder and robbery, much less severe maximum sent-
ences are allowable.2 1 Only after the third conviction of these more
serious crimes would the mandatory life sentence apply. In conclusion
the court held that this analysis of the four "relevant criteria under the
eighth amendment" rendered the petitioner's punishment unconstitu-
tional.2 8
Judge Boreman dissented from the court's analysis and conclu-
sion.21 In a general attack on the test employed by the majority, he
argued that it was impossible to determine the relative weight given to
the various factors and that therefore the guidelines would be practically
impossible to apply to other cases. Noting the paucity of authority on
the application of the proportionality test, he concluded that he was
disturbed by the "chaos which may result from this decision."'30 Fur-
thermore, he specifically disagreed with the court's evaluation of the
nature of Hart's offenses. Asserting the inevitability of a statutory cut-
off point, he found that for purposes of constitutional analysis the fact
that the 1949 bad check was written for only fifty dollars was irrelevant.
Although he agreed it was technically true that Hart's crimes were not
violent ones, he stated that the petitioner's perjury occurred at a trial
on a murder charge, "one of the most serious and cold-blooded
crimes .... -31 Finally, Judge Boreman dismissed the majority's con-
cern for Hart's moral dilemma at his son's trial as one possibily appeal-
ing to a jury but inappropriate in the disposition of this appeal. The
strong suggestion in this dissent was that since the sentence was man-
dated by statute, it should not be adjudged excessive.32
2 Id. at 15-16.
1Id. at 16.
11Id. at 17.
"
9Id. at 23-33. Judge Boreman also attacked the majority's disposition of several other issues
in the case. See notes 10 & 13 supra.
"No. 71-1885 at 33.
31Id. at 30.
32See id. at 31, 33.
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PRECEDENT AND THE APPLICATION OF THE PROPORTIONALITY THEORY
That the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unu-
sual punishment" 33 requires proportionality in sentencing is well set-
tled. 34 The United States Supreme Court held in 1910 that it is "a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense, ' 35 and at least twice since that time the Court
has reiterated support for the theory.36 However, Judge Boreman cor-
rectly recognized that a methodology for applying the theory "has never
definitely and conclusively been determined. ' 3 Indeed, courts when
faced with a claim of an excessive punishment often never reach analysis
and dismiss the challenge on grounds either that the punishment was
within the limits of statutory law 8 or that the sentencing judge did not
abuse his discretion.39 The few courts that have reached the merits
typically have considered only whether the punishment, when compared
with the crime, "shocks the conscience." 40 Only a miniscule number
have developed objective tests to aid in analysis, 1, and none have given
much attention to justifying the criteria they have used.4 2 Attention will
now be directed to these latter decisions in an attempt to evaluate the
criteria used in Hart.
"The eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 n.l (1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"'See. e.g., Note, Judicial Limitations on the Constitutional Protection Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160, 162, authorities cited note 4 supra.
31Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
"See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962); (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
3'Hart v. Coiner, No. 71-1885 at 33 (4th Cir., July 13, 1973)..
'See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 266 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 200 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462, 467 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Wallace, 269 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir.
1959); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38,43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1959); United
States v. De Marie, 261 F.2d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1959); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338,
340-41 (8th Cir. 1930).
"See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir.1971) (citing general rule);
United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703 (4th Cir. 1965).
"See, e.g., Coon v. United States, 360 F.2d 550, 555 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873
(1966); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96, (6th Cir. 1957); United States v. Rosenburg, 195 F.2d
583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 64,
196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946).
"See, e.g., cases cited notes 44-45, 56-57 infra.
"But see In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). After reviewing
proportionality precedent, Lynch applied three of the four factors used in Hart without mentioning
the legislative purpose criterion. However, the court did not say that its test was constitutionally
required. Nor did the tribunal offer a thorough theoretical justification for its test.
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Several courts are in accord with Hart in stressing the trivial nature
of the offense43 as an important factor to be considered.'" In Weems,
for example, the Supreme Court emphasized that the defendant was
falsely claiming only a few hundred pesos as a government expenditure45
and that the offender gained nothing from this crime and injured no
one.4" In O'Neil v. Vermont47 Justice Field stressed that the liquor of-
fense for which that defendant was convicted in Vermont was not even
a crime in New York, the defendant's residence." Further, the defen-
dant's only connection with Vermont was certain jugs of liquor which
he had sent to that state via common carrier.49
Other courts have stressed the nonviolent nature of the crime in
judging proportionality. A Michigan court"0 emphasized that the sale of
marijuana was a nonviolent crime in holding that a compulsory prison
sentence of twenty years for that offense was "so excessive that it
'shocks the conscience.' ,,5' Yet, the absence of violence is not necessar-
ily a requirement for a finding of disproportionality. In Ralph v.
Warden, 2 for example, in which the defendant had been convicted of
forcible rape and sentenced to death, the court, although conceding that
"'there is a sense in which life is always endangered by sexual at-
tack' -3 stated that "there are rational gradations of culpability that
can be made on the basis of injury to the victim. 54 Thus, the court held
that, since life was neither endangered not threatened in the case before
it, the death sentence was disproportionate to the crime.55
"No. 71-1885 at 10 ("The bad check case was very nearly trivial .. ").
"See United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 1970); Faulkner v. State, 445
P.2d 815, 818-19 (Alas. 1968).
"217 U.S. at 358, 366 see Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 818-19 (Alas. 1968).
"1217 U.S. at 365.
17j44 U.S. 323 (1892).
111d. at 337 (dissenting opinion). This opinion was relied upon heavily by the majority in
Weenis.
"Id. at 337-41.
"OPeople v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).
"Id. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 834.
1438 F.2d 786, (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
"id. at 788, quoting Packer, supra note 4, at 1077.
11438 F.2d at 788.
'While this harm-no harm dichotomy may be useful in establishing a general hierarchy of
crime, it leaves many unanswered questions:
There is a virtually infinite array of conduct engaged in daily by all of us that carries
with it some danger to persons or property. The risk may be a great risk of some small
danger or a small risk of some great danger. The danger may be of short-run conse-
quences or of long-run accumulation of minor problems. The risk may be of direct
physical harm or harm to property, or it may be indirect. ...
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Probably the most extensively used criteria are those that compare
the punishment for a particular crime with punishments for similar
crimes in other jurisdictions" and with other crimes in the same jurisdic-
tion.5 Weems relied extensively on this comparative approach because
"the sentence in this case may be illustrated by examples even better
than it can be represented by words. '15 The Court showed the excessive-
ness of the penalties for falsifying a public document by listing a variety
of more serious federal crimes that were not punished so severely. The
Court also examined the punishment for an offense of the same general
nature as that charged and found that "the highest punishment possible
for a crime which may cause the loss of many thousands of dollars, and
to prevent the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater
than that which may be imposed for falsifying a single item of a public
Wheeler, supra note 4, at 862.
Hart's evaluation of the nature of the crime might seem inconsistent with its analysis in Ralph.
In both bases the defendant was given the maximum punishment allowable for any crime in the
respective jurisdictions. Hart was given a life sentence and Ralph, a death sentence. Since Ralph
held that the absence of actual or threatened violence was determinative, arguably Hart could have
found disproportionality without discussin the trivial nature of the crimes involved.
One possible basis for this difference in evaluation is that Hart considered the variance in the
severity of capital punishment and life imprisonment significant; thus, the petitioner's sentence
could not have been held disproportionate to his crimes without a finding that his culpability was
less than that of the defendant in Ralph. In addition, however, Hart differed from Ralph by
focusing on an analysis of the combined relevant factors. Hart then was characterizing the crimes
as only one part of its evaluation. Without a thorough evaluation of the nature of the crimes, the
data available for the court's analysis would have been incomplete.
Indeed, it would seem that any analysis should focus on evaluation both of the nature of the
crime and of the punishment involved in a case since the theory as stated in Weerns establishes
these factors as unknowns in the proportionality equation. At least arguable, however, is the notion
that the comparative test, discussed in text accompanying notes 56-62 infra, is a better measure of
the nature of a crime than an abstract evaluation because legislatures in setting punishments have
tended to establish hierarchies of crime according to their different levels of culpability. On the
other hand, Hart's cumulative test, No. 11-1885 at 9, has the advantage of giving the appellate
court more data to use in dealing with a complex subject. For instance, the nature-of-the-crime
test permits the consideration of mitigating circumstances where the appellate court deems this is
necessary.
"1See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786,791-92 (4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 58-59, 245 P.2d 788,
792-93 (1952); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 179, 194 N.W.2d 827, 832 (1972).
5TSee O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (dissenting opinion); State v. Evans, 73
Idaho 50, 59, 245 P.2d 788, 793 (1952); Dembrowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252-53, 240 N.E.wd
815, 816-17 (1968); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 176-78, 194 N.W.2d 827, 831-32 (1972);
State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423, 426 (1878); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 629, 632-33, 281 P.2d 233,
235 (1955).
"1217 U.S. at 380. The Court did not, however, state or even suggest that this test was
mandated by the eighth amendment.
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account." 59
Although few courts have attempted to justify this test, one has
stated that "an objective indication of society's 'evolving standards of
decency' can be drawn from the trend of legislative action."' " Another
has stated that although there may be isolated instances of excessive
punishment enacted by the legislature because of transitory public emo-
tion, a legislature will usually "act with due and deliberate regard for
constitutional restraints in prescribing the vast majority of punish-
ments. ... 61 Thus, the criminal statutes are "illustrative of constitu-
tionally permissible degrees of severity; and if among them are found
more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in question,
the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect.""2
In support of a legislative purpose test, 63 Hart turned to Justice
'd. at 381. Several commentators have asserted, however, that Weems' support for the
comparative test was undermined in a later Supreme Court case. Turkington, Unconstitutionalhy
Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the Weens Principle, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 145, 148 (1967); Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-
Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996, 1008-09 (1964); Note,
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Eighth Amendment Applied to Sentence
Within Statutory Limits, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 882, 884 (1969). In Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391 (1916) (Holmes, J.), the defendant claimed that a thirty-five year prison sentence, five
years for each of seven separate letters deposited in the mail in the execution of a scheme to
defeaud, was disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 393. This allegation was dismissed cursorily.
Id. at 394. The significant aspect of Badders is that Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court,
cited Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903), a case expressing strong opposition to the compara-
tive test: "That for other offenses, which may be considered by most, if not all, of a more grievous
character, less punishments have been inflicted does not make the sentence cruel." Id. at 135-36
(dictum). The citation may have been a deliberate attempt to weaken the comparative test since
Holmes had joined Justice White in dissenting in Weems.There are several possible mitigating factors in the Badders case, however. First, its preceden-
tial value is limited by the brevity of the Court's attention to the eighth amendment issue. More
importantly, Weems, which was decided just six years before, was not even cited in Badders. Justice
Holmes' main objection to Weems was his opposition to the proportionality theory itself and not
to its method of application. See 217 U.S. at 385 (White, J., dissenting). Certainly, a citation to
Justice White's dissent would have better served his purposes. The Court may have tipped its hand
when it berated the petitioner for stating a vast number of obviously feckless grounds for relief
and then refused to consider them. See 240 U.S. at 394. In addition, the Court may have felt it
unnecessary to use an objective analysis because the crime and punishment did not initially "shock
their conscience." See note 68 infra.
"Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 186, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
"In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 426, 503 P.2d 921, 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 228 (1972). It may
be questioned whether a state's statutory scheme is the result of its conscious adherence to eighth
amendment standards rather than solely a response to what it considers relevant policy considera-
tions.
621d.
'No. 71-1885 at 11.
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Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia.64 However Justice
Brennan, unlike the Court in Weems, did not believe that proportional-
ity should be analyzed by a combination of factors. Rather he asserted
that proportionality is overshadowed by a lack-of-necessity test: "Al-
though the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be
grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the
more significant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose
more effectively than a less severe punishment." 5 Neither Justice Bren-
nan nor the majority in Weems suggested how such a test would be
implemented. In fact, proof that a more serious punishment fulfills a
legislative purpose better than a lesser punishment may be impossible.6
Lacking such evidence courts are likely to turn to conclusory statements
such as those encountered in Hart.6 7 Throughout its discussion of this
test general abhorrence was expressed at the severity of the punishment
for suqh insignificant crimes.68
01408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972). Justices Marshall and White also expressed support for this test
in their concurring opinions, id. at 311, 331.
"Id. at 280.
"iWheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment I1: The Eighth Amendment After Fur-
man v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REv. 62,77-78, (1972).
"See No. 71-1885 at 12.
The court never suggested a lesser punishment that would serve the deterrent purpose as well
as life imprisonment even though it commented that life imprisonment is justified only on the
theory that "more is better." Id. at 13.
Also, the court apparently misread the deterrent theory when it commented that "if a life
sentence is good for the purpose [of deterrence], surely a death sentence would be better." Id. at
11-12. Implicitly, this position recognizes only the fear function of deterrence: "the criminal who
engages in rational decision-making will consider the possible penalties for various choices of
action and, other things being equal, will act in the way which holds the least dangerous conse-
quences." Wheeler, supra note 66, at 75. It has been recognized, however, that deterrence consists
of an educational function as well. See, e.g., Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?,
43 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 176, 179-80 (1952). Theoretically, a criminal statutory structure imports
to the citizenry the immorality of various types of conduct, with the goal that "[p]unishments are
thereby supposed to create not only conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing
crime, but also inhibitions against committing a more severe crime rather than a less severe one."
Wheeler, supra note 66, at 75. Thus, to argue that a death sentence would as well serve the deterrent
purpose as life imprisonment in regard to a particular crime is lacking in its failure to consider
the effect of the increased sentence on the entire scheme of statutory crimes.
Of course, a more basic question than whether the legislative purpose test is proper as applied in
Weems concerns whether the test is proper at all. For a thorough analysis that concludes that the
legislative purpose test is subsumed by a proper proportionality test in most instances and is
impractical in the remaining, see Wheeler, supra note 66, at 71-79.
r'This general abhorrence suggests that the punishment "shocked the conscience" of the court
independently of the tribunal's proportionality analysis. We may speculate that the court will not
give extended consideration to the substance of an eighth amendment challenge unless it is initially
shocked. See Turkington, supra note 59, at 148. Supporting this notion is United States v. True-
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
PROPORTIONALITY IN PERSPECTIVE
Although Hart fails to provide justification for its proportionality
analysis, the decision at least attempted to develop a methodology for
applying the eighth amendment. The constitutionally required criteria
are important because they may potentially force courts to do more than
pronounce their boiler plate that sentences will not be reviewed either
because they are within statutory limits or because there was no abuse
of discretion. Hart's contribution will be minimal, however, if courts use
the criteria only after determining that their consciences are shocked, a
possibility suggested earlier.6 9 The analysis still would limit wholly
subjective determinations of disproportionality.
Even if the Hart analysis is applied in all cases in which proportion-
ality is in issue, objectively should not be overemphasized. In Trop v.
Dulles the Supreme Court only commanded that reviewing the constitu-
tionality of a statute "requires the exercise of judgment, not the reliance
on personal preferences."7 Ralph v. Warden, however, stated: "The
constitutionality of Ralph's punishment cannot rest on the subjective
opinions of the judges who imposed the sentence or of the judges who
must review the case. On the contrary, his punishment must be tested
objectively."' 7' While Ralph apparently intended only to paraphrase
Trop's admonition, its language may be misunderstood. No analysis of
proportionality can be wholly objective, for the "evolving standard""2
used in evaluating punishments under the eighth amendment precludes
development of a formula that will almost automatically produce a
conclusion. The criteria, set forth in Hart, therefore, should be viewed
as placing limits on appellate subjectivity rather than supplanting it. The
guidelines should amelioriate the situation that compelled one writer to
love, No. 72-2495 (4th cir., Aug. 9, 1973) (per curiam) (Craven & Boreman, JJ., joining Winter,
J., in an unanimous decision), in which the court, upon rejecting a challenge to a five year sentence
stated: "In the absence of the most exceptional circumstances, a sentence that does not exceed the
statutory limits is within the sole discretion of the trial judge and an appellate court has no
authority to review it." Id. at 2. Also, in Wood v. South Carolina, (No. 72-1336 (4th Cir., July
13, 1973), the court rejected a challenge of disproportionality without employing the cumulative
test used in Hart. The petitioner in Wood had plead guilty to two counts of making an obscene
telephone call and was sentenced tb a term of five years in prison on each count, the sentences to
run concurrently. Surely, if Hart had established a proportionality test of general applicability, this
test would have been used in Wood, an opinion handed down the same day as Hart and decided
by the same panel.
"See supra note 68.
70356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
71438 F.2d 786, 789 (1970), citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
72438 F.2d at 101; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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conclude: "[I]t probably makes little practical difference in most cases
whether a judge professes to follow community conscience or not. The
appeal is essentially to his own innate standards of fairness and human-
ity."73
Furthermore, there may be a distinction between appellate review
of statutes requiring mandatory sentences and of statutes allowing judi-
cial discretion in setting the punishment. In Wood v. South Carolina,74
the court in its very brief analysis stressed that the sentencing judge may
have considered the defendant's prior record of convictions in setting the
punishment. In Hart, on the other hand, it was emphasized that the
judge was totally without discretion. 75 The assumption in Hart may have
been that either at the trial court or appellate level there must be a
consideration of personally mitigating circumstances in evaluating pro-
portionality. This, however, does not negate appellate review of punish-
ments given in the discretion of the sentencing judge. To the contrary,
the appellate court might find that there are no personal circumstances
that could justify the punishment because of the great discrepancy be-
tween the crime and punishment on their face-a discrepancy deter-
mined from the use of criteria like those used in Hart, albeit without
consideration of personal circumstances.
Proportionality analysis is not yet, if it ever will be, a safeguard
against the myriad inequities in sentencing practices. As the Fourth
Circuit cases discussed above illustrate, the courts have had difficulty
in applying the eighth amendment standard. In addition, legislatures
have much more flexibility to deal with the broad policy questions
involved in developing well integrated sentencing schemes. Nevertheless,
the courts must not abdicate their responsibility under the constitution
to nullify a punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense commit-
ted To effectuate this mandate, they must criticize and improve the
criteria used in Hart.
JOE STALLINGS
"Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 4, at 851.7
'
4No. 72-1336 (4th Cir., July 13, 1973).
71No. 71-1885 at 14-15.
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Criminal Procedure-Lowering the Standared for Defendant's
Understanding of his Miranda Rights
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the United States Supreme Court set forth
stringent rules regarding the extent to which a defendant must be in-
formed of his constitutional rights and the procedure for waiver of those
rights. The Court placed a "heavy burden" of proof on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights in the absence of counsel, 2 citing the Johnson v. Zerbst3 test
as the standard to be applied. However, Miranda failed to set forth
exactly how this "heavy burden" could be met by the prosecution, how
the burden differed from the previous "totality of circumstances" test4
for voluntariness of confessions (if at all), and what the police responsi-
bilities were regarding waiver, especially when the defendant indicated
that he misunderstood his rights.5 United States v. Frazier6 is one of a
series of cases that aids in resolving these questions.
Frazier is not a drastic departure from past cases but is a clear
example of the relaxation of the Miranda proof of waiver stan-
dard-from a rather demanding and uncertain standard requiring the
government to prove that the defendant actually understood his rights
to an objective standard requiring proof that the defendant "could have
understood" them.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Frazier, a twenty-eight year old black arrested in connection with
a robbery, was twice read his constitutional rights. He then orally
waived them after being asked if he understood each one, promptly
signed a standard waiver form,7 and just as questioning began, confessed
to a series of robberies in an apparent attempt to clear a friend. As the
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2Id. at 475.
-304 U.S. 458 (1938). This case required that waiver of a constitutional right be voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent, viewing the totality of the circumstances.
'Id. at 464.
'The problem was foreseen b'y early commentators who realized the lower courts would
probably be in no better position to set a standard for sufficiency of the government's proof under
the "heavy burden" mandate than before under Zerbst. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
536, (1966) (White, J., dissenting); Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on
Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 199 (1966).
-476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'Id. at 893 n.3. There was no evidence of any physical coercion, pressure, or disruptive
atmosphere.
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questioning officer began to take notes, Frazier stopped him saying,
"Don't write anything."'8 The officer did not seek to determine whether
Frazier knew his oral statements were admissible against him. The
subsequent conviction, based substantially upon the oral confession, was
appealed on the ground that the defendant had not knowingly and intel-
ligently waived his rights.' The three judge panel remanded the case for
the government to present more evidence on that issue, noting that the
defendant's "ban on note-taking inveighs against intelligent waiver,"" °
but that the government could rebut "the strong implication" by evi-
dence that the police had in some way reacted to this alerting circum-
stance'2 and made sure the defendant actually'3 understood the warn-
ings. On remand the defendant failed to testify to the reason for his
prohibition on note-taking. The government's only significant showings
were the results of a mental examination of Frazier that found him of
average intelligence, and a doctor's opinion that Frazier "could under-
stand and appreciate and comprehend" the meaning of the warnings.)4
The lower court found the prosecution had met its burden and that the
waiver was valid based on the uncontroverted facts of the record. How-
ever, the trial judge gave no express consideration to the effect of Fra-
zier's failure to allow note-taking, despite the emphasis given that point
in the prior court of appeals remand opinion.
On appeal,' 5 a panel of the court of appeals reversed the trial
court,'" making it clear that when an accused exhibits signs of misunder-
ld. at 893.
'Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Ild at 1169,
11Id. at 1168.
""Alerting circumstance" is a term commonly used by the courts to define any activity,
speech, or condition of the accused that could indicate his inability to make a valid waiver, due
either to the inconsistencies of accused's actions or his physical and mental attributes. See United
States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 1967).
"The court was of the opinion that Miranda required an "awareness" of the consequences
of waiver in order to make an understanding exercise of the privilege. 419 F.2d at 1168 n.31. The
court thus required the government at least to rebut, if not to foreclose, the possibility that the
defendant misunderstood. Note that the conjecture here as to why the defendant banned note-
taking went in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1168.
"United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 895, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Note that this evidence
went only to the intelligent waiver issue but not necessarily to the knowing waiver issue to be
discussed later.
"Id. at 902 (the three judge panel decision is reported in the appendix to the en bane opinion).
111d. at 906. The court of appeals originally remanded the case as an opportunity for the
government to introduce evidence that the police did respond to defendant's remarks on note-
taking and that they thereafter explained more fully to defendant his rights, fulfilling their duty
1973]
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standing his rights, it is the duty of the police to ensure that the accused
can make an informed decision." On rehearing en banc, the trial court's
findings were reinstated. The full court reasoned that the government
had met the burden imposed by Miranda by proof (1) that the warnings
were given properly and (2) that the person warned was capable of
understanding them.18 The court asserted that the burden then shifts to
the defendant to prove that the "alerting circumstance," here the ban
on note-taking, arose from misunderstanding of his rights," not from
some unrelated cause. Conjecture about the reason for the ban is now
allowed in his favor-he must offer proof."0 But the defendant here did
not testify-he failed to offer the most persuasive proof at his disposal.
If he had, the decision may well have been different. The court expressed
the belief that the police should not be held responsible for analysing
the actions of the defendant or for placing legal interpretations on the
Miranda warnings.2 '
The court, faced with a "normal" defendant22 and an "alerting
circumstance," applied an objective test, requiring the prosecution to
prove only that the defendant could have understood the warnings. It
then shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that he actually did
misunderstand. This test appears to be a far cry from the "heavy burden
under Miranda. The burden was on the government to rebut the presumption of misunderstanding,
but the government addressed no new evidence to that issue. The government showed only that
Frazier "could have understood."
211d. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938); United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Washing.
ton, 341 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1965); In re Lawrence, 29 N.Y.2d 206, 325 N.Y.S.2d 921, 275 N.E.2d
577 (1971): N. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSIONS STANDARD-MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 69 (1966); 19
AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcTS § 5 at 12, § 8 at 18, § I I at 21 (1967); Rothblatt & Pitler, Police
Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers- Where Do We Go From Here?, 42 NOTRE DA, E LAWYER
479, 490 (1967). The Frazier court added that speculation as to why the defendant banned note-
taking "cannot meet the Government's burden . . . of rebutting with affirmative and convincing
evidence the inference that appellant did not validly waive his privilege." 476 F.2d at 905-06.
11476 F.2d at 897-98.
"The court admitted that even where capacity exists, misunderstanding can still occur, Id. at
897.
2This sharply contrasts with the original decision forbidding conjecture in the government's
favor. Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
21"When the police have, as hare, faithfully followed the exact procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court, inferior courts should be slow to mandate, after the fact, enlarging responsibilities
alien to the duties and the training of policemen." 476 F.2d at 899. The court seemed especially
ready to limit police responsibility where there were no signs of police coercion Miranda was
intended to discourage.
"The defendant was of average intelligence, sufficient age, not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, not emotionally upset, not interrogated or held at length, and not physically coerced.
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of proof" originally promulgated in Miranda and alarmingly close to
permitting the ritualistic reading of the rights deplored in that deci-
sion.2?
FIFTH AMENDMENT WAIVER UNDER MIRANDA
Miranda speaks of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in very strong terms, requiring "real understanding and
intelligent exercise of the privilege. ' 24 It directs not only that a state-
ment of the rights be given, but also that they be understood. 25 The
government was given this additional responsibility of insuring under-
standing essentially for two reasons: to mitigate the inherently coercive
atmosphere of custodial interrogation, in which the accused's adver-
saries are in complete control; and to require the government to respect
the dignity of the individual and thereby maintain the delicate state-
individual balance-the main purpose of the privilege against self-
incrimination.26
The courts reach the question of the defendant's understanding of
his rights most often when considering the waiver issue, since other
alleged violations of the Miranda rules focus more on police conduct
than on defendant reaction. Johnson v. Zerbst,2 cited in Miranda,28
required proof of a voluntary, knowing, 29 and intelligent 0 waiver of a
constitutional right viewing the totality of the circumstances3, and en-
couraged "every reasonable presumption against waiver .... , ",32 In
pre-Miranda applications of Zerbst to determine voluntariness of con-
3384 U.S. at 476.
' d. at 469. The court went on to say "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. . . a valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from silence of the accused .. " Id. at 475. Also, any evidence of trickery or
cajolery to obtain waiver will show the defendant did not voluntarily waive his rights.
--See generally N. SOBEL, supra note 17, at 69; 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FACTS § 5 at 12, § 8
at 18, § II at 21 (1967); Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 17, at 490.
21384 U.S. at 460; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57 (1964); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2251 (J. MeNaughton rev. 1961).
-'304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21384 U.S. at 475.
- 304 U.S. at 465. Knowing waiver requires the defendant to waive his rights with complete
knowledge, awareness, and cognition of what he is doing. See generally 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF
FACTS § 29 at 52 (1967).
11304 U.S. at 465. Intelligent waiver requires the defendant to possess sufficient intellectual
ability to comprehend the meaning and significance of the warnings and the capacity to make a
competent decision. See generally AM. JuR., PROOF OF FACTS § 31 at 55 (1967).
1'304 U.S. at 463-65.
32Id. at 464.
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fessions, courts considered the same types of circumstances that post-
Miranda courts consider in determining knowing waiver. 33 Many cases
examine whether the accused had the capacity to understand and waive
his rights because of his age, intelligence, background, physical state,
length of detention, or physical treatment. 34
Faced with considering the "totality of the circumstances" and
evaluating it to determine if the "heavy burden" imposed by Miranda
had been met, most courts were reluctant to set a standard that the
Supreme Court had left undefined. Some courts merely stated that the
burden had been met and set no standard at all;35 others said that they
simply believed police witnesses, 3 and defendants continually lost
"swearing contests ' 37 because of the greater credence given police testi-
mony.3 Judges, attorneys, and police officials alike were aware of the
uncertainties involved in Miranda's failure to define the standard of
proof required. 39 Judges balked at requiring the state to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused actually understood the warnings,
since the state often had little evidence besides the defendant's attributes
and police testimony. Attorneys balked at depending upon decisional
'See N. SOBEL, supra note 17, at 12; Warden, Miranda-Some History,jSome Observa-
lions, and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. REv. 39, 54 (1966).
3'See Leighton v. Cox, 365 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1966); Annot., 22 L. Ed. 2d 872, 878-79 (1970);
Note, Legal Limitations on Miranda, 45 DENVER L.J. 427, 454 (1968).
'See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 392 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968). See also United States v.
Folette, 393 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1968); Hodge v. United States, 392 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1968); Griffin
v. State, 116 Ga. App. 429, 157 S.E.2d 894 (1967); State v. McDaniel, 272 N.C. 556, 158 S.E.2d
874 (1968): Note, Aftermath of Miranda-The Courts Grapple With Burden Of Proof, 71 W. VA.
L. REv. 180, 181 (1969); cf. Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968).
-See, e.g., Parish v. State, 117 Ga. App. 616, 618, 161 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1968).
'See, e.g., Lathers v. United States 396 F.2d 524, 533 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Anderson, 394 F.2d 743, 746 (2d Cir. 1968); Green v. State, 223 Ga. 611, 613, 157 S.E.2d 257,
259 (1967); State v. Clyburn, 273 N.C. 284, 290, 159 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1968). See also Warden,
supra note 33, at 35.
'See Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 645, 658-59 (1967). At the other extreme were several commentators and cases interpreting
Miranda as requiring a presumption in favor of the accused. See B. GEORGE, Jr., CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 291 (1973); Rogge, Proof by Confession, 12 VILL.
L. REV. 1 (1966); Comment, Custodial Interrogation as a Tool of Law Enforcement; Miranda v.
Arizona and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 21 Sw. L.J. 253, 262 (1967).
"'See Note, Constitutional Law-Self Incrimination-Right To Counsel To Protect The
Fifth Amendment Privilege, 16 AM. U.L. REV. 141 (1966); Note, Criminal Law-Confessions
-The Restraints Society Must Observe Consistent with the Federal Constitution in Interrogating
Suspects, 18 S.C.L. REV. 853 (1966); Note, Intoxicated Confessions: A New Haven in Miranda?,
20 STAN. L. REV. 1269 (1968); Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination; The Scope and
Application of Miranda, 37 UMKC L. REV. 260, 299 (1969); Comment, Miranda and Waiver, 4
WILLAMETTE L.J. 205 (1966).
[Vol. 52
MIRANDA RIGHTS
law because each case turned on its own facts 0 with few circumstances4"
seeming to command more weight than the others. Police officials,
believing the new warnings would impede police interrogation tech-
niques, were not sure whether they were commanded to "serve as attor-
ney" to an accused by explaining his rights to him when he refused
counsel. In such a setting, and with other cases limiting Miranda in
other areas,42 United States v. Frazier takes on special significance.
THE ABSENCE OF UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
First of all, the case deals with a "normal" defendant. Innumerable
cases have dealt with defendants who because of wounds,4 3 injuries,"
seizures,"5 narcotics," or liquor,47 to name only a few, might have been
incapable of the awareness required for an understanding and knowing
waiver. Equally as many cases have dealt with defendants, who because
of age,4" mental capacity,49 prior contact with police 0 or lengthy interro-
gation,5' made rather clearly unintelligent waivers. Frazier fell into none
of these categories. He was middle-aged, reasonably healthy, and of
average intelligence, as the court found on remand. He had no external
"excuse" for misunderstanding the warnings. Since Frazier considers a
defendant without any infirmities to cloud the "totality of circumstan-
"Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
"These circumstances are lengthy interrogation, incommunicado incarceration, and the fact
that the admission or confession did not "follow closely" the giving of the warnings. See generally
19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcrs § 36-39 (1967).
42Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (determination f a confession's voluntariness by
preponderance of evidence was not a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (otherwise inadmissible confessions usable for impeachment
purposes if trustworthy).
"See People v. Miller, 135 Cal. 69, 67 P. 12 (1901).
"See State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 92-96, 115 A.2d 62, 79-81 (1955).
"sSee People v. Baksys, 26 App. Div. 2d 648, 272 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1966).
"See United States ex rel. Townsend v. Sain, 276 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1960); People v. Cobb,
45 Cal. 2d 158, 287 P.2d 752 (1955); People v. Waack, 100 Cal. App. 2d 253, 223 P.2d 486 (1950);
State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 122 P. 748 (1912).
"
7See People v. Townsend, 1 111. 2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729 (1957). See generally Annot., 22 L.
Ed. 2d 872, 878-79 (1970).
"See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). See generally Annot., A.L.R.2d 1160 (1960);
19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcrs § 32 at 56 (1967).
"See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FAcTs § 33 at 58 (1967).
"See United States v. Bolden, 355 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1965). See generally 19 AM. JUR., PROOF
OF FAcTs § 34 at 61 (1967).
5"This is the very activity Miranda itself violently condemns. See also Ziang Sung Wan
v. United States, 266 U.S. i (1924); 19 AM. JUR., PROOF OF FACrS §§ 36, 37 (1967).
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ces" test, the decision offers insights into both the protections of the
accused and the burden of proof placed on the government when the
accused who has allegedly misunderstood his rights 2 is "normal" and
the circumstances of the waiver and confession are not suspect. The
confession and waiver in Frazier were obtained without long or incom-
municado interrogation, without the "third degree" and without prom-
ises or threats-all circumstances Miranda enumerated as militating
against waiver.53
THE ALERTING CIRCUMSTANCE
An accused can rarely expect to nullify an express waiver and
confession simply by testifying that he misunderstood his rights, 4 nor
can he expect the police to detect the misunderstanding of clearly given
warnings"' without some indicator. The cases become more favorable to
the defendants when an additional "alerting circumstance" appears.
Various acts of the accused have been found to serve as such indicators.
The most common has been the accused's refusal to sign a waiver or
confession, while remaining willing to confess orally." Although some
5rrhe court recognized the fact that people with the capacity to understand the warnings still
might not. United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Statistical studies have
determined that a high percentage of the average population, even without the pressures of arrest,
misunderstands the basic rights given in the Miranda warnings. Doubtless then, many defendants
of average capacities could misunderstand their rights. See Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial
Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capitol: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Micli. L.
REV. 1347, 1374 (1968) (15% misunderstood warnings regarding the privilege against self-
incrimination); Griffiths, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors,
77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967) (majority of those interviewed misunderstood rights from mere warnings
read to them).
0384 U.S. at 475-76.
5See Warden, supra note 33, at 55. This writer has discovered no cases so holding in a
thorough examination of post-Miranda cases. However, commentators (soon after Miranda was
decided) thought this might be possible, reading Miranda literally and believing the heavy burden
to be approaching a presumption of inadmissibility. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 534
(1966); (White, J., dissenting); B. GEORGE, JR., supra note 38. See also Rogge, supra note 38;
Comment, 21 Sw. L.J., supra note 38, at 262; Comment, 37 UMKC L. REV., supra note 39, at
303.
'Cases in which the warnings have been improperly given provide an entirely different basis
for claiming exclusion of a confession-violation of the very clear cut rules set down in Miranda.
Courts have readily excluded evidence in this area where the standard is clear and easily applied.
See, e.g., United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966).
SSee, e.g., United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v.
McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); !ettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 888 (1968); United States
v. Bird, 293 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Mont. 1968); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1968).
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courts have held the contradictory nature of this single act imposes an
additional duty upon the police to recognize the defendant's possible
misunderstanding about the admissibility of oral statements, 57 most
have held the opposite view."8 Though on first sight, Frazier would seem
to fall in line with these decisions, it is important not to lump it too
readily with these "refusal-to-sign-waiver" cases. First, courts have not
given much weight to this refusal, reasoning that if Miranda rejects the
signing of a waiver as conclusive proof of waiver59 then the police and
court have no duty to recognize failure to sign (standing alone) as a
conclusive indicator of misunderstanding or invalid waiver." Secondly,
the indicator in Frazier stands alone without any other evidence mitigat-
ing against the possibility of misunderstanding, unlike most of the "re-
fusal to sign" cases.6
Despite the fact that the "refusal to sign" cases may turn on distin-
guishable principles and facts, they are enlightening in the standard of
police conduct that they set in contrast to Frazier. Some have intro-
duced the "reasonable man" standard-if a reasonable police officer
would recognize the alerting circumstance as evidence of failure to com-
prehend, he has an additional duty to insure understanding. 2 Frazier
makes it clear that no such standard exists. After the warnings have
been given in the proper manner, without impeding circumstances, and
the accused has openly admitted his understanding, the police need not
evaluate the situation further.6 3 Frazier is not the first case to adopt this
proposition, 4 but it is the first case so to hold without some additional
evidence (such as defendant's prior contact with the law or the giving
of his confession in such a way as to make it obvious that he knew it
5 See, e.g., United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Bird, 293
F. Supp. 1265 (D. Mont. 1968); People v. Randall, I Cal. 3d 948, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114
(1970).
'See, e.g., United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970); Pettyjohn v. United
States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1968);
Comment, 37 UMKC L. REV., supra note 39, at 307.
-P384 U.S. at 475.
CUnited States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815
(Mo. 1968); Land v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 223, 176 S.E,2d 586 (1970).
aSee, e.g., Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Ruth,
394 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 888 (1968).
2United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion); accord, United
States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cit. 1968). But see Comment, 37 UMKC L. REV., supra
note 39, at 307.
63United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"United States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pettyjohn v. United States, 419
F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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was admissible) to mitigate the possibility that the defendant misunder-
stood. Therefore, in Frazier the court has set the first clearly demonstra-
tive standard for police responsibility in insuring understanding of the
Miranda warnings-when faced with a "normal" accused, the police
must comply with the letter of the Miranda warnings, but they need not
indulge in interpretations of the defendant's conduct relating to his
possible misunderstanding when he states that he understands his rights.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
It would be misleading to believe that the Frazier standard of police
responsibility is unrelated to the job of the prosecutor. If the police are
required to exercise very limited responsibility to insure actual under-
standing, can the prosecution meet its "heavy burden" of proof? Since
each case turns on its own facts,"5 cases are difficult to analogize; how-
ever, several general theories have been advanced. Some give any rea-
sonable doubt to the defendant on the misunderstanding issue;6 some
accept proof of capacity to understand unless there is an alerting cir-
cumstance which then raises the government's burden;"1 some express
discomfort at having to make a determination on actual understand-
ing; 8 some say the defendant simply cannot claim misunderstanding
after a signed waiver without more proof;6, some consider an alerting
circumstance, such as calling a lawyer, the equivalent of an expression
of desire to cease the questioning, bypassing the waiver issue entirely;"
but those most closely analogous to Frazier employ the burden shifting
theory,71 usually without expressing it in those terms.
Frazier is an excellent example of the theory in its simplest form.
The prosecutor cannot be expected to offer evidence to negate every
possible circumstance that might imply misunderstanding; 72 he does not
'Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
"See, e.g., United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966).
"See, e.g., United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970).
"See, e.g., Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870
(1968).
"See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1970).
7"People v. Randall, I Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114 (1970), 83 Cal. Rptr. 658.
"United States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pettyjohn v. United States, 419
F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1968).
7Such a burden on the prosecution would require the courts to give the defendant the benefit
of conjecture. The three judge panel in Frazier believed that the defendant was entitled to such a
benefit since actual understanding was involved. 476 F.2d at 905-06. The later opinion of the court
en banc reversed that position, refusing to speculate in the defendant's favor. 476 F.2d at 898.
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have access to the only source of first hand evidence bearing on actual
understanding-testimony of the defendant. Therefore the government
is only required to present a prima facie case for waiver by showing that
the defendant was uncoerced, intelligent enough to comprehend the
warnings, and sufficiently informed of his rights to be capable of a
knowing choice of action.7 3 The defendant then must rebut the prima
facie case. 74 Often, his only means is his own testimony 5 since he had
no counsel present during interrogation. As a practical matter, what the
defendant can say will be very limited-he will merely state that he
misunderstood his rights. The court will then be left with weighing the
evidence of capacity to understand against the defendant's testimony of
misunderstanding.
All this boils down to a neatly objective test of waiver in which the
government need only prove the capacity to understand (a far cry from
the "heavy burden" of establishing actual knowledge originally called
for in Miranda). There is one major reservation. The court implied that
the decision might well have been different had the defendant testified,
but in fact, that may not be true at all. In United States v. McNeil,71
on facts similar to Frazier (except that the "alerting circumstance" was
refusal to sign a waiver), defendant's testimony that he misunderstood
his rights had no effect on the outcome. The same is true in Pettyjohn
v. United States.77 And in Frazier itself, the court's finding that the
police had fulfilled all of their responsibilities toward Frazier conflicts
with the later language about the defendant's failure to testify. The court
has given its blessing to a very objective set of police procedures and
responsibilities 7 (intimating that if faced with such a situation again, the
police could use the same procedure) which would be employed long
before it was known whether the defendant would testify. 7 This would
seem" to indicate that the police will not violate any of the defendant's
constitutional rights by failing to recognize the possible misunderstan-
"State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Mo. 1968). This is exactly what the court proved in
Frazier.
"This is referring only to a case like Frazier-one without any of the infirmities or coercive
circumstances discussed earlier.
"Either because of error of counsel of decision of the defendant, Frazier did not testify.
76433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970).
71476 F.2d at 892, 899.
"Seemingly the court would not have so vigorously defended the police actions (the opinion
even refers to it as "having important implications with respect to judicial definition of the respon-
sibilities of law enforcement officers . . ." id. at 892) if the procedures could so easily have been
found inadequate simply because the defendant testified that he misunderstood.
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ding. However, if the accused can obtain exclusion of his confession by
testifying, one of his rights must have been violated. It is inconsistent
for the court to condone this limit on police responsibility and still
exclude the confession, since such use of the exclusionary rule would
encourage the police to go further than the court seems to require to
insure understanding. Certainly the court would not encourage such a
paradox of police motivation. Therefore, Frazier's objective standards
of proof of waiver and police responsibility are not likely to be over-
turned by defendant's testimony, even though the case spoke of its
importance.
CONCLUSION
The reasons Frazier reached such a decision on the standards of
proof and police conduct are speculative. The case may reflect the view
that now Chief Justice Burger took in the dissent to Frazier's original
appeal" and echoed in the final decision-Miranda and the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination are to prevent compulsive self-
incrimination and where, as in Frazier, that end has been served, confes-
sions should not be excluded because of possible minor infringement on
the means by which they were obtained. The decision could reflect the
view evident in other opinions 8-that it is necessary for the defendant
to make a voluntary decision but not necessarily a wise one. It could
signal a gradual softening of the Miranda stringencies in the face of the
old, but recurring complaints about the exclusionary rule.81 In any case,
United States v. Frazier sets forth both a clearly objective, burden-
shifting test as to proof of waiver-a significant diminution of the
"heavy burden" mentioned in Miranda, and an equally objective stan-
dard of police conduct regarding waiver. Frazier makes waiver under
Miranda a more discernable facet of the law, even though it may have
eroded part of Miranda's defendant-benefiting rules in the process.
ROBERT SHERWOOD LILIEN
"Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., dissenting),
"
1See United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972).
"Cases cited note 42 supra. See People v. Artuello, 65 Cal. 2d 768, 423 P.2d 202, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 274 (1967) (courts allowing certain types of trickery absolutely banned by Miranda); Elsen
& Rosett, supra note 38, at 667-68; Annot., 99 A.L.R. 2d 772, 786 (1965).
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Insurance-Waiver of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Because of the phenomenal increase of automobile accidents in the
United States over the past thirty years, most drivers have purchased
automobile liability insurance. Thus the average driver's concern for his
own economic well-being has ensured that in a majority of accidents,
the injured party has a reliable source, an insurance company, to com-
pensate him for at least part of his damage. However, a significant
number of persons are injured by negligent drivers who have neither
liability insurance nor private funds to provide compensation. State
legislatures have moved to ease the difficulties of these injured persons,
and statutes in forty-six states2 require that some type of uninsured
motorist coverage 3 be offered in all automobile liability insurance poli-
cies. In thirty-five states,4 however, the statute allows the insured to
reject such coverage.
The Pennsylvania statute5 considered in Johnson v. Concord Mu-
'See A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 3-17 (1969) for a history of
uninsured motorist protection laws in general.
Maryland, New Jersey and North Dakota have unsatisfied judgment funds from which those
injured by uninsured motorists may be compensated. Wyoming has no provision for victims of
uninsured motorists. See 3 Cum.-San. L. Rev. 200, 202 n.9 (1972).
'This coverage provides for the policy holder and other insureds in the event of an accident
caused by an uninsured and financially irresponsible driver. Under most endorsements, the injured
insured is able to collect, from his own insurance company, compensation for injury up to the
amount that would have been paid had the uninsured driver carried the minimum insurance
required by the state financial responsibility laws.
Most endorsements are somewhat limited however in that, in general, insurers will not offer
uninsured motorist coverage in amounts over the state minimum requirement for liability insur-
ance. Further, uninsured motorist coverage deals, for the most part, only with recovey for personal
injury. If a motorist wishes to have coverage for property damage, he must obtain it through
purchase of collision insurance. See A. WIDISS, supra note I, at 136-37.
'Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, South
Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia have statutes requiring mandatory inclusion of
uninsured motorist coverage in insurance policies issued within the state. See A. WIDISS, supra note
I, at 310.
'At the time of the Johnson decision the statute provided:
No policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for
bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this State with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State, unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death as are fixed
from time to time by the General Assembly . . . under provision approved by the
Insurance Commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehi-
cles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom:
Provided, however, that the named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage
in writing . . ..
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tual Insurance Co.' allowed such a waiver. However, in defining valid
waiver, the legislature went no further than to specify that the rejection
be in writing. In Johnson, the plaintiff had purchased a liability policy
and had signed a statement at the bottom of the binder-application that
claimed, "I HEREBY STATE THAT I DO NOT DESIRE UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN MY AUTO LIABILITY
POLICY." After being involved in an accident with an uninsured mo-
torist, plaintiff Johnson brought a suit in equity against his insurance
company seeking reformation of his policy. Johnson alleged that his
signature under the above statement did not constitute a valid rejection
of uninsured motorist coverage and that therefore the coverage was
improperly excluded from his policy.
In deciding this case, the Pennsylvania court was faced for the first
time with interpreting the validity of a signed written waiver placed in
the policy to comply with statutory requirements. Relying heavily on
California cases dealing with a statute which was at that time similar
to Pennsylvania's, the court ruled that the statute gave insureds a legal
right to uninsured motorist coverage which could be waived only with
"knowledge of such a right and an evident purpose to surrender it."'
Since the court found that the statement plaintiff had signed was insuffi-
cient on its face to constitute a valid and knowledgeable waiver, the
burden was on the insurer to prove that the insured had "intelligently
and knowingly" waived coverage Since the testimony taken at the trial
did not reveal that uninsured motorist coverage had been discussed in
detail by plaintiff and the insurance agent, the court held that the insurer
had not met its burden of proof and "[i]n these circumstances, the
insured's signature, is insufficient to establish an effective rejection of
his statutory right of protection."'"
In finding the waiver ineffective, the court disregarded the tradi-
tional rules of waiver applied in contract cases in which the intent of
the parties is not examined if the meaning of the binding words is
obvious." Instead, the court applied the more stringent rules of waiver
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1971).
'450 Pa. 614, 300 A.2d 61 (1973).
7CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 1963), as amended. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp.
1973).
1450 Pa. at - 300 A.2d at 65.
'450 Pa. at , 300 A.2d at 65, citing Litchenberger v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 7 NC.
App. 269, 172 S.E.2d 284 (1970).
"1450 Pa. at _ 300 A.2d at 65.
"t5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 681 (3d. 1961).
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of personal liberty rights announced in recent criminal cases that stress
the individual's knowledge of his rights and his voluntary decision to
forego them.12
The basis of this decision can be found partly in past judicial inter-
pretation of legislative intent in passing uninsured motorist statutes. For
example, in Bankes v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.'3 the
insured while riding on a newly acquired motorcycle, had been killed by
an uninsured motorist. His insurance company refused to compensate
the family on the grounds that the policy in effect at the time of the
accident specifically did not cover newly acquired uninsured "land
motor vehicles." The company further argued that this exclusion was
authorized by the Insurance Commissioner since he had approved policy
forms which provided that uninsured motorist coverage would not apply
to injury suffered by a policyholder while occupying an uninsured "auto-
mobile" owned by him. In invalidating the "land motor vehicle limita-
tion," the court spoke of the legislative intent in passing the statute-to
provide protection for innocent victims of highway accidents. 4 In order
to carry out this intent the statutory provisions must be given liberal
construction, and any limits of the policy repugnant to the protective
purpose of the act must be disregarded." In this case, the approved
"automobile" exclusion could not be broadened to a "land motor vehi-
cle" exclusion since it was the intent of the legislature to provide cover-
age, rather than to restrict it.6
The need for liberal construction of the statute and narrow reading
of policy exceptions to uphold legislative intent was also the basis for
decision in an earlier Pennsylvania case. In Harleysville Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Blumling,7 the insured while at work was involved in an
accident with an uninsured motorist. He was originally compensated
'"See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
As will be discussed later, the test of knowledgeable and intelligent waiver of uninsured motorist
coverage had been applied previously in other state courts. See text accompanying notes 19-25
intfra.
1216 Pa. Super. 162, 264 A.2d 197 (1970).
""The intent of this act is that the insured recover those damages which he would have
received had the uninsured motorist maintained a liability policy." Id. at 168, 264 A.2d at 200.
11d. at 165, 264 A.2d at 198.
"In regard to the "automobile" exclusion which had been approved by the Insurance Commis-
sioner and relied on by State Farm, the court noted, although it did not decide, that this exclusion
was probably never contemplated by the legislature. As a basis for this, the court mentioned that
the legislature had considered this specific limitation in a 1968 amendment to the uninsured
motorist act, but had excluded it from the final amendment. Id. at 167, 264 A.2d at 199.
'7429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968).
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through his employer's uninsured motorist coverage, and his own com-
pany denied coverage on the basis of a limiting clause in his policy that
provided for deduction of previously paid compensation. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court ruled this limitation invalid through a liberal
construction of the statute. Although the statute provided that the in-
sured would have at least 10,000 dollars coverage under his policy, this
could not be construed to limit his total recovery to only 10,000 dollars
if another's policy had provided him with compensation.18
The Johnson case can be distinguished from the previous cases in
several respects. In both Bankes and Blumling, the insured had pur-
chased and paid for coverage, and in each case the insured was clearly
covered for some uninsured motorist loss. Bankes and Blumling estab-
lished that Pennsylvania courts, using liberal construction of the statute
to satisfy legislative intent, would not look favorably on company re-
strictions placed on uninsured motorist endorsements. However, in
Johnson the court was presented with a slightly different problem, per-
haps more difficult to resolve even by using the precedent of liberal
construction. Johnson had not paid for any uninsured motorist coverage
and had signed a waiver form that had been specifically provided for
by statute.
To hold for the insured in this case, the court would not have to
liberally construe a broad statute giving general coverage, but would
have to define or limit a seemingly explicit portion of the statute that
allowed waiver. However, the same public policy that mandated liberal
statutory construction to accomplish legislative intent has been found
to also require narrow and strict construction of that portion of the
statute allowing rejection of coverage. 9
Other jurisdictions have previously decided cases concerning waiver
of uninsured motorist protection and have concluded that waiver of
coverage is effective only if the waiver manifests the intentional relin-
quishment of the right to protection. In Hagar v. Elite Insurance Co.2"
an injured policyholder had also signed a simple waiver of uninsured
motorist coverage.2' As in Johnson, the insured claimed that neither his
111d. at 395, 241 A.2d at 115.
"450 Pa. at _ 300 A.2d at 64.
-'22 Cal. App. 3d 505, 99 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971).
-1The waiver signed here read:
The applicant hereby agrees with the company that the coverage of Uninsured Motor-
ists, is excluded from the policy and that the policy shall afford no coverage for damage
caused by uninsured motor vehicles under the provision of the applicable section of the
insurance code of the state in which this insurance is written.
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statutory right to the coverage nor the terms of the coverage had been
explained to him. The California court, in holding this waiver inade-
quate, distinguished this case from other contract cases. "Because such
coverage is indicated by the legislature to be a matter of public policy,
a claim of deletion is not determined simply by reference to the rules
that courts otherwise apply to determine the intent of contracting par-
ties. 1 2 Since the motorist has a legal right to insurance under the stat-
ute, this right must be explicitly explained and clearly understood. Mere
mention of the availability of uninsured motorist protection is not
enough to show a clear explanation and the insured's signature under a
one line waiver is not sufficient to claim clear understanding.
3
The possible ambiguities of a similar simple waiver statement were
pointed out, again by the California court, in Bohlert v. Spartan Insur-
ance Co.2 14 in which the court explained,
[T]he language providing that "the policy shall afford no coverage for
the damage caused by an uninsured motor vehicle" does not show the
prospective insured that it means damage incurred by him; he could
readily construe it to mean coverage for damage caused to others by
an "uninsured motor vehicle" for whose operation he was responsi-
ble. . ..
Considering these possible ambiguities of a single waiver and the statu-
tory right of the insured to receive coverage, the court found that
"[b]ecause the language is ambiguous to this extent, it does not-on its
face-meet the standard that an agreement excluding uninsured motor-
ist coverage must be 'conspicuous, plain and clear' to constitute an
'effective waiver' thereof."2
However, liberal construction of the statute has not always de-
feated policy limitations. In Dreher v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 21
the plaintiff was injured by a motorist whose insurance company later
became insolvent. Aetna denied liability because the plaintiff's policy
defined an "uninsured automobile" as "an automobile with respect to
the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is no bodily liability
If Uninsured Motorist Coverage NOT Desired, Sign Here
Id. at 507, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
221d. at 509, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
ld. at 510, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
3 Cal. App. 3d 113, 83 Cal. Rptr.. 515 (1969).
'-Id. at 119, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
-1d. at 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 519-20
2183 III. App. 2d 141, 226 N.E.2d 287 (1967).
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bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident .... ,1
The court was presented with the issue of whether this definition
precluded recovery from Aetna. The Illinois statute29 in effect at the
time of the accident made no reference to the definition of an uninsured
automobile. However, the legislature, at the time of the decision, was
considering a law that would explicitly extend uninsured motorist pro-
tection to the situation in which the negligent driver's company became
insolvent after the accident. Even so, the court ruled,
[W]e find nothing either in the statute or the case law to sustain the
contention that the public policy of this State, at the time, required
that an insurance company extend coverage beyond the terms of its
contract of insurance to include an automobile which was insured at
the time of the accident but which consequently becomes uninsured by
reason of the involvency of the carrier."
The Pennsylvania superior court took this same view in a similar
situation in Levy v. Keystone Insurance Co.31 in deciding
[a]ny ambiguity in a contract of insurance is to be construed most
strongly in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Furthermore,
it would seem that in the light of the reasons behind uninsured motorist
"'ld. at 142, 226 N.E.2d at 288.
"Act of June 4, 1963, § 1 [1963] Ill. Laws 1029 (codified, as amended ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
73 § 1065.151 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
"83 Ill. App. 2d at 143, 226 N.E.2d at 289. In North Carolina, the state supreme court was
faced with a similar situation in Rice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 267 N.C. 421, 148 S.E.2d 223
(1966) (per curiam). The version of North Carolina General Statutes § 20-279.21(3) which was in
effect at the time of the accident discussed in Rice was silent on the question of whether subsequent
insolvency of the insurer would make a previously insured vehicle "uninsured" for the purposes of
the statute. Ch. 640 [19611 N.C. Sess. Laws 831.
However, in 1965 the legislature amended the statute to include in the term "uninsured motor
vehicle," a vehicle "where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment . . . because of
insolvency." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1965). Later in 1965, in Buck v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34 (1965), the supreme court recognized the legislative
intent in passing the amendment and in dicta noted that the statutory addition would preclude
denial of uninsured motorist coverage in situations in which the negligent motorist's insurance
company became insolvent after the accident.
In deciding Rice. however, the North Carolina court, like the Illinois court in Dreher, refused
to retroactively apply the amended statutory definition. Further, the North Carolina court, unlike
the Illinois court, took no notice of the new legislative intent, even in view of Buck which implied
judicial recognition of the new policy. See Note. Insurance - Statutory Definition of an Uninsured
Motor Vehicle When the Liability Insurer is Insolvent or Denies Coverage, 45 N.C.L. REv. 551
(1966).
'209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899, (1966) rev'd sub nona. Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426
Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967).
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coverage. . . a liberal construction should be given to any such provi-
sion in an insurance policy. Nevertheless, we find no ambiguity in these
contracts and we cannot, within the realm of judicial reason expand
the definition of an uninsured motorist to fit the facts of these
cases .... 32
In Illinois, the position the court took in Dreher was effectively
replaced by passage of a statute.13 In Pennsylvania, the decision of the
superior court was overruled by the supreme court.34 Explicitly citing
liberal construction of the statute as necessary to achieve legislative
intent, the supreme court held the term "uninsured motorist" to include
not only those motorists uninsured at the time of the accident, but also
those whose insurance companies were unable to pay compensation due
to insolvency.3 '
In a Florida waiver case involving uninsured motorist insurance,
Kohly v. Royal Indemnity Co., 31 an appellate court considered and
rejected the public policy argument. The plaintiff had been injured by
an uninsured motorist while driving a rented car. The rental company,
Hertz, had purchased liability insurance for its customers but had re-
jected uninsured motorist coverage. The specific statutory provision
read, "[T]he coverage required under this section shall not be applicable
where any insured named in the policy shall reject the cover-
age. . .. -3" The plaintiff contended that any should be read to mean
"every" or that named should be ignored. Under this interpretation, the
plaintiff argued that he, as an insured under the policy, had not been
given the opportunity to reject coverage and therefore, it should be
extended to him as a matter of right.
The court considered decisions holding that the public policy be-
hind the Florida statute required that insureds injured by uninsured
motorists be able to recover as if the negligent motorist had a liability
policy. However, it did not extend liberal construction to cover this case.
It rejected plaintiff's contention regarding the statutory construction
and relied on previous cases which had held "that the term 'named
3
'1d. at 19-20, 223 A.2d at 901 (citations omitted).
39lLL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73 § 1065.151 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (originally enacted as Act
of June 4, 1963, § 1 [1963] 111. Laws 1029).31Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967).
"Id. at 338, 231 A.2d at 405. This liberalizing decision was cited in Johnson as precedent for
its construction of the statute in the waiver situation. 450 Pa. at -, 300 A.2d at 64.
1190 So. 2d 819 (Fla. App. 1966).
31FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851 (1963), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (Supp. 1972)
(emphasis added).
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insured' has a restricted meaning and does not apply to persons other
than those named in the policy." s Thus Hertz, as the insured named
in the policy, had the right to reject the insurance and bind all others.
Other Florida cases have dealt with related situations and applied
liberal construction to effect a broad coverage when specific limitations
were placed on persons receiving coverage. 9 However, the statutory
language discussed in Kohly may well be too explicit to raise a question
of liberal construction and any changes in the law will have to come
through legislation. 0
Although the trend toward more liberal construction of an ambigu-
ous waiver clause was well established even before Johnson, the mere
presence of such a clause will not give the insured recovery if the insurer
can show that the insured made a knowledgeable waiver. In Pechtel v.
Universal Underwriters," the court found the waiver clause to be con-
fusing, but that surrounding facts and the policyholder's own testimony
tended to show he knew what he was waiving.4" In light of this proof, a
passenger of the policyholder who was injured in an accident with an
1"190 So. 2d at 821.
"'See Southeast Title & Ins. Co., 224 So. 2d 718 (Fla. App. 1969) where the court held that
an endorsement that specifically excluded from liability 3 of the insured's sons who were under 25
would not exclude them from uninsured motorist coverage due to the legal right they had to such
insurance. See also First Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. App. 1968).
"In Weatherford v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. 22
(1966), the California Court of Appeals examined a similar contention by a plaintiff that the
statutory provisions giving "any named insured" the right to reject coverage should be construed
to mean that waiver of coverage should be allowed only of all the insureds rejected it. Here the
California appellate court quoted with approval the memorandum of the trial court which con-
cluded that "any" means one not all and that the policy of deciding thus was a legislative, rather
than a judicial matter.
"15 Cal. App. 3d 194, 93 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1971).
'
2However, according to the author's reading of the case, the court does not satisfactorily
clarify its finding that the policy holder knew what provisions he was waiving. He picked up the
policy application at a motorcycle dealer's and did not discuss it with an agent. He rejected a
provision entitled "Family Protection Against Uninsured Motorist" which the plaintiff contended
was ambiguous because it could have led the purchaser to believe that he only waived protection
for his family, but retained the other incidents of uninsured motorist coverage. The only proof to
which the court refers of the purchaser's knowledge of coverage provisions is that he discussed the
policy with Navy buddies. In concluding the court says, "Finally, if the applicant had inquired [of
an agent] as to whether he could exclude the family protection and secure uninsured motorist's
coverage for himself alone, he would have received a negative answer." Id. at 205, 93 Cal. Rptr.
at 61.
This statement, which seems to uphold an ambiguous waiver on the grounds that the policy
holder could have had the ambiguity clarified if he had asked, does not seem to be in agreement
with other California rulings which have held against the insurer if the policy itself did not make
the waiver clear. See Bohlert v. Spartan Ins. Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 113, 83 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1969).
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uninsured motorist was not allowed to recover simply because the
waiver itself was ambiguous.
Johnson is clearly a product of the liberalizing trend shown by the
courts in dealing with automobile insurance cases. However, Kohly and
Pechtel were also decided by courts which had accepted and indeed led
in the trend. This clearly indicates that there is question as to how far
the courts are willing to go to give the insured protection.
Liberal construction of the statute and "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of statutory rights were the only precedents mentioned in
Johnson. However, the ruling might also be taken as an example of
Keeton's theory of honoring the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured.'3 Briefly described, this theory allows the policyholder to collect
under policy terms that explicitly bar recovery because "insurers ought
not to be allowed to use qualifications and exceptions from coverage
that are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a policyholder
having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of coverage in-
volved."44 Keeton goes on to explain that the policy holder ought to be
allowed to recover "even though the insurer's form is very explicit and
unambiguous, because insurers know that ordinary policyholders will
not in fact read their policies."4 While this principle could not be used
to deny the insurer an opportunity to include exceptions to coverage in
a policy, qualifications that would defeat the reasonable expectations
could be upheld only if the policyholder was "fully informed" of their
nature."6
While the principle of honoring reasonable expectations is too
broad to be universally applicable and has only occasionally been recog-
nized in the cases, Keeton sees it as the direction ii which insurance law
seems to be moving, and as a better explanation of the results in many
cases which are justified on other grounds.47
This theory can be aptly applied to the Johnson facts inasmuch as
Johnson's previous policy had included uninsured motorist coverage4 8
and the statute itself gave him a right to coverage unless rejected. While
the new policy did contain an exception to what he might "reasonably
expect" on the basis of past experience, there was no evidence that he
11R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW - BASIC TEXT § 6.3, at 350-61 (1971).
111d. at 351.
tDld.
"N1. at 361.
uld. at 351-57.
"450 Pa. at _ 300 A.2d at 62, n.1.
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was fully informed of the nature of such an exception."
No matter how it is viewed, however, Johnson and the cases that
it followed present serious problems for legislatures. If the courts inter-
pret the policy behind the uninsured motorist protection statutes as
strongly as Johnson would seem to indicate, yet still put limitations on
public policy considerations as in Kohly and Pechtel, broadly worded
statutes with imprecise waiver limitations can only create litigation.
Legislative response to this problem has followed several different direc-
tions. Legislatures in eleven states" have prevented the problem by
making coverage mandatory. Pennsylvania, by amending the statute
considered in Johnson, dealt with the issue by severely limiting the
situations in which waiver of coverage will be allowed."' California,
whose 1963 statute" was similar to the Pennsylvania law construed in
Johnson and whose court decisions were heavily relied on in Johnson,
amended its uninsured motorist statute, effective January 1, 1973, to
include a specific waiver form explaining the right to and the meaning
of uninsured motorist coverage. The statute explicitly states that "exe-
cution of such an agreement shall relieve the insurer of liability under
this section. 5 3
"Id. at - 300 A.2d at 65.
'See note 4 supra.
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1971), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1963) states
that rejection, in writing, is only allowed by
(I) An owner or operator of (i) any motor vehicle designed for carrying freight or
merchandise, (ii) any motor vehicle operated for the carriage of passengers for hire or
compensation, having in either instance been granted a certificate of public conveyance
or a permit by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or been issued a certificate
of public convenience and necessity or a permit by the Interstate Commerce Commission
and (2) An owner or operator of any other motor vehicle designed for carrying freight
or merchandise or operated for the carriage of passengers for hire whose employees are
insured under the provisions of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act ....
"
2CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 1963), as amended, CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp.
1973).
"'The required waiver states:
The California Insurance Code requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorists cover-
age in each bodily injury liability insurance policy it issues covering liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Such section also permits the
insurer and the applicant to delete such coverage completely or with respect to one or
more natural persons designated by same when operating a motor vehicle. Uninsured
motorists coverage insures the insured, his heirs, or legal representatives for all sums
within the financial responsibility limits which such person or persons are legally entitled
to recover as damages for bodily injury, including any resulting sickness, disease, or
death, to him from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle not owned or
operated by the insured.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1973).
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While it is too early to ascertain" whether the California or Penn-
sylvania approaches will curtail all waiver litigation in these states, it is
not inconceivable that insureds will still have the opportunity to litigate
their claims. Especially in the case of the California statute, the issue
might be raised that because of some special circumstance-inability to
understand English or cursory treatment by an insurance agent-the
specified waiver could not be applied in an individual instance. This
problem could become increasingly pressing, especially if, as Keeton
indicates, the theory of honoring the reasonable expectations of the
insured becomes the trend in insurance case law.55
While this note has dealt only with the problem of waiver of unin-
sured motorist coverage protection, the waiver issue is not confined to
this narrow area. Problems can be readily anticipated in new areas,
especially under No Fault statutes, such as the one in effect in Massa-
chusetts" in which the policyholder is given the right to property protec-
tion under his policy, but has the opportunity to waive his coverage if
he was at fault in an accident, or to forego coverage entirely.57 Although
no cases have yet been reported in this area, it is not hard to imagine a
situation in which a policyholder might claim an ineffective waiver of
his right to coverage, either because he did not understand what he was
waiving in choosing less than complete coverage or because he reasona-
bly expected full coverage because of the term "No Fault" and the
publicity that has surrounded discussion of this concept."
Examined from this broader perspective, the need to deal with the
waiver problem in the narrow area of uninsured motorist protection
becomes more compelling. While it cannot be suggested that all auto-
mobile insurance waiver problems may be solved by reference to this
one issue, steps taken here might serve as guidelines for action in other
areas. Most courts, as reflected in Johnson, have taken the approach
that public policy mandates protection for the victim of the uninsured
motorist. However, judicial construction of public policy might be lim-
ited, as shown in Kohly and Pechtel and consequently, results are often
uncertain. It seems clear that if the legislative aim is one of public
protection, it is now up to the legislatures to make their policy clear and
either make uninsured motorist coverage strictly mandatory or limit the
"Research has revealed no reported cases dealing with these waivers.
1R. KEETON, supra note 43, § 6.3 at 357.
"'MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1972).
"
7MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 340 (Supp. 1972).
5See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
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waiver opportunities to narrowly defined groups, such as the current
Pennsylvania law. Only after such action can each member of the public
be assured of protection.
SANDRA R. JOHNSON
Securities Regulation- Glenn Turner: Closer to Economic Realities
A transaction comes within the purview of the federal securities
laws' only if it can be brought within one or more of the terms listed in
the statutory definition of a security! The traditional test enunciated by
the Supreme Court3 for one of these terms, the "investment contract,"
has been criticized by some state courts4 and by several commentators.5
Such criticism, however, was absent in the federal court opinions when
the Oregon federal district court, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter-
'Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. k§ 78a-z (1970).
-Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b)(1) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3 (a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(10) (1970). Section 77 (b)(1) reads:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferra-
ble share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a secu-
rity, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," . . . .
Securities Act of 1933, § 2 (I), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b)(1) (1970).
The delinition in the 1933 Act is "virtually identical to that contained in the 1934 Act."
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
If the transaction alleged to be a security does not fall within one of the specific categories
delineated in the definition, reference should be made to the more general classifications. SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
3SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
'See. e.g., Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969). afrd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485
P.2d 105 (1971); cf. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Silbergerg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
sSee. e.g., Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347 (1970); Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security"': Is There a-More Meaning/id Formula, 18 W. Rus. L.
REV. 367 (1967). Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities /let
of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967); Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agree-
nent as a Security Under Securities Acts. Incuding lOb-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311
(1969): Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971). Franchise Symposium: Franchising as a Security 33
OHIo ST. L.J. 718 (1972); Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to Be Regulated, 61 GEo. L.J. 1257
(1973).
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prises, Inc.,' modified the qualification in the traditional test requiring
that profits from an investment contract "come solely from the efforts
of others."'7 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision and will now find
an investment contract in spite of investor participation if the investor
efforts are not "those essential managerial efforts which affect the fail-
ure or success of the enterprise."" The purpose of this note is to deter-
mine whether the test should have been changed at all, and if so, whether
the Glenn Turner modification is a good one.
The Glenn Turner court was confronted with the pyramid sales
scheme of Dare to Be Great, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. Ostensibly Dare sold through four "adven-
tures" and one "plan" a motivation training course consisting of printed
materials, tape recordings, and group instruction. The most important
feature of two of the "adventures" and of the "plan," however, was the
right granted to the purchaser to help sell the motivational courses to
others. A handsome commission was the reward for a successful sale
In spite of his technical role as a salesman, the investor's duties and
responsibilities were somewhat limited; 10 his task was to induce prospec-
tive purchasers or "prospects" to attend meetings and weekend Golden
Opportunity Tours during which his selling effort was secondary to that
of the Dare "people."" The general tone of the meetings and tours was
reminiscent of revival meetings, and the element of high pressure, hard-
sell salesmanship was never absent. 12 In affirming the District Court's
holding that the transactions of Dare were investment contracts, 13 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found (1) an investment of
6348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. October 9, 1973).
'SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
'SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
11d. at 477-80. "The major emphasis . . . is on the opportunities for earning money by
purchasing Adventure 4." 348 F. Supp. at 770.
"1474 F.2d at 478-80. For example, salesmen were instructed not to explain to prospective
purchasers what they were selling. 348 F. Supp. at 770.
"474 F.2d at 479. At each meeting, after the speakers had finished, the purchaser-salesman
would attempt to convince his prospect to buy. Often "agents of defendants who are specialists at
the required techniques of psychological hard-sell take over and accomplish the sale." 348 F. Supp.
at 770.
"2474 F.2d at 479-80.
"The district court held that the transactions of Dare were securites under three separate
parts of the statutory definition, first, "a certificate of interest or participation in amy profit-sharing
agreement," secondly, "investment contract," and, finally, any "instrument commonly known as
a 'security."' 348 F. Supp. at 773-76.
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
money, (2) a common enterprise, and (3) an expectation of profits to
come from the efforts of others. The court was troubled by the language
in the traditional test that profits come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." The court, however, adopted a more flexible approach and held,
[I]n light of the remedial nature of the legislation, the statutory policy
of affording broad protection to the public, and the Supreme Court's
admonitions that the definition of securities should be a flexible one,
the word "solely" should not be read as a strict or literal limitation
on the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be con-
strued realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes
which involve in substance, if not form, securities.' 5
The test thus adopted was "whether the efforts made by those other than
the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential manage-
rial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."'"
In applying the definitional provisions of the securities acts, the
Supreme Court has employed two broad policies which are set forth in
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp."7 and Tcherepnin v. Knight." In
Joiner, the term "investment contract" was held to include the offer and
sale of assignments of oil leases when the transaction also involved the
drilling of a test well "so located as to test the oil-producing possibilities
of the offered leaseholds."' 19 Joiner had argued that, notwithstanding its
remedial nature, the Securities Act should be construed strictly, since
its violation is a crime. The Court answered, "Though penal laws are
to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to
defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. ' 2 Moreover, in explain-
"474 F.2d at 481-82.
11id. at 482.
"Id. The district court's phrasing of the test is similar, but is set in terms of the relevancy of
the efforts. "in applying the Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract. . .the efforts
of others which are relevant for purposes of the definition are those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." 348 F. Supp. at 775.
7320 U.S. 344 (1943).
"389 U.S. 332 (1967).
"1320 U.S. at 346. "The exploration enterprise was woven into these leaseholds, in both an
economic and a legal sense; the undertaking to drill a well runs through the whole transaction as
the thread on which everybody's beads were strung." Id. at 348. Furthermore, the fraud found by
the trial court, though not material to the question of security vel non, involved the location of the
leased properties in respect to the test well. Id. at 347 n.4.
-'Id. at 354. Legislative intent as expressed by the 1933 Act is "[T]o provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933,
ch. 38, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74. In addition, House of Respresentatives' Report No. 85 states that
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ing the proper construction of the terms in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act,2'
the Court emphasized that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the
obvious and commonplace. 22
In Tcherepnin, the Court found a withdrawable capital share in an
Illinois savings and loan association to be a security under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.23 Pointing out that remedial legislation, such as
the 1934 Act, "should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes, '2 4
the Court continued, "One of the Act's central purposes is to protect
investors through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securi-
ties. .... "25 Furthermore, in striving to determine the meaning of the
word "security" for the purposes of the securities laws "form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality."'2
The leading case defining an "investment contract" is SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.2 1 Two transactions were involved in Howey: first, the sale
of Florida orange grove acreage and, secondly, the sale of service con-
tracts for the cultivation of the purchased property.28 Noting that the
investors were by and large non-resident professional people,2 Justice
Murphy, speaking for the Court, found that the transactions were secur-
ities.3 " Though the term "investment contract" was undefined by the
one of the aims of the 1933 legislation is "that the persons, whether they be directors, experts, or
underwriters, who sponsor the investment of other people's money should be held up to the high
standards of trusteeship." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1933).
2-See note 2 supra.
2320 U.S. at 351.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if
it be proved as a matter of fact that they are widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "investment con-
tracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security'."
Id.
'389 U.S. at 345.
211d. at 336.
2Id.
251d.
-328 U.S. 293 (1946).
"'Id. at 295. The W.J. Howey Company sold the land, and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.
cultivated and cared for the acreage thus sold, if such services were desired by the purchaser. Both
corporations, however, shared the same offices, utilized the same personnel, and were under direct
common control. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1945).
"328 U.S. at 296. These investors did not possess the requisite skills or equipment for the care
and cultivation of citrus groves. "They [were] attracted by the expectation of substantial profits."
Id.
"Id. at 299.
Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The
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1*933 Act, he determined that at the time of the enactment, the meaning
had been crystallized by state court decisions under the "blue sky"
laws.3' It was "therefore reasonable to attach that meaning to the term
as used by Congress, especially since such a definition is consistent with
the statutory aims. ' 3 The meaning thus derived was stated as follows:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 4 though agreeing with
the SEC that securities law coverage extended to established businesses,
had viewed the non-speculative character of the Howey enterprises as
controlling.35 This evaluation of the risk of the particular enterprise was
viewed as apposite to the determination of "the critical question,
whether in fact the purchase was of a specific thing having specific value
in itself or was of a thing having no value unless the enterprise as a whole
should succeed." 36 The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach
saying, "[I]t is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or non-
speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without intrin-
sic value. . . . The statutory policy of affording broad protection to
investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formu-
la e . ,37
investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promoters man-
age, control and operate the enterprise. It follows that the arrangements whereby the
investors' interests are made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the
legal terminology in which such contracts are clothed.
Id. at 300.
"Id. at 298. See. e.g., State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937
(1920). where the court, finding a security under the state law, said, "The placing of capital or A
laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment is an
'investment' as that word is commonly known and understood." Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938. The
North Carolina Supreme Court applied the above quoted statement from State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co. in State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930), and found no security saying,
"[The investor] was to get his income from the gross amount received for his individual service
.- Id. at 139, 153 S.E. at 858.
-293 U.S. at 298.
"Id. at 298-99.
'SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945).
111d. at 717. "But it may not be doubted that in close cases, like Joiner's was, the fact that
an activity is purely promotional and speculative does have weight. Id.
3GId.
:n293 U.S. at 301.
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The Howey test has been applied without deviation by many federal
courts to varying situations: brokerage discretionary accounts,38 fran-
chise agreements, 39 contracts for the purchase and raising of beaver, 40
and distributorship agreements.4
In State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,4 2 the Hawaiian court deter-
mined that the transactions of a corporation employing a pryamid-sales
scheme similar to that of Dare to Be Great were securities. The
promoter desired to open a retail store selling merchandise only to
possessors of special authorization cards. Each investor (founder-
member) in the enterprise was to receive a commission on future retail
sales to persons to whom that founder-member had given authorization
cards. In addition, the investor was to receive a fee for recruiting others
into the organization.44
The State urged a liberal interpretation of the Howey test and
contended that the efforts expected of the investors were minimal in
nature and that "the founders are substantially dependent upon the
management of the corporation for a successful return on their invest-
"E.g., Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (investment con-
tract; broker was to make all investment decisions); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (no investment contract; plaintiff was to make investment decisions).
"'E.g., Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (no
investment contract; investor realized success of business depended on his own efforts); Huberman
v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (investment contract; purchase
agreement for property included provision that the rent paid by the lessee, in whose operation
investor did not participate, was to be determined in part from lessee's profits).
"E.g., Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971) (investment contract; defendants
provided everything necessary to profit); Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th
Cir. 1967). cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968) (investment contract; after buying beaver and paying
ranching fee, investor did nothing more).
"E.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969) (no investment
contract; both agreement and brochure demonstrated that scheme relied on efforts of the investor);
United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964) (investment contract; profit was anticipated
whether investors participated actively or inactively).
"252 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
"The Hawaii Market Center and Dare-type plans are both discussed by the Securities Ex-
change Commission under the topic "Multilevel Distributorships." SEC Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 5211, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3387 (November 24, 1971),
reproduced in 1971-72 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,446 [hereinafter cited as SEC Release].
"52 Hawaii at 643-44, 485 P.2d a't 107. To become a founder-member at the distributor level,
the investor executed a founder-member contract and purchased for $320.00 merchandise with a
wholesale value of $70.00. To enter the organization at the supervisor level, the investor executed
the contract, and purchased for $820.00 merchandise with a wholesale value of $140.00. A supervi-
sor earned higher fees and commissions than a distributor and also received override commissions
when his distributors were successful. Id.
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ment. ''1 5 The court, however, declined to base its decision on the Howey
test opining that Howey had "led courts to analyse investment projects
mechanically, based on a narrow concept of investor participation ' 4
rather than on a sounder concept focusing on the economic realities of
a security.47 The court determined that the basic economic reality of a
security was the "subjection of the investor's money to the risks of an
enterprise over which he exercises no managerial control."48
Following this basic precept, the court posited a new definition,
saying:
[A]n investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's prom-
ises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding
that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value,
will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise,
and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise."
The court viewed the initial value as being subjected to the risks of
the enterprise" for two reasons. First, the recruitment fee was based
11Id. at 646, 485 P.2d at 108. This is the general approach aavocated in SEC Release.
1S52 Hawaii at 647, 485 P.2d at 108.
"
7Id., 485 P.2d at 109.
"Id. at 648, 485 P.2d at 109. This concept was advanced by Professor Coffey. See Coffey,
supra note 5, at 412.
1152 Hawaii at 649, 485 P.2d at 109. As the court acknowledges, this new test is essentially
the same as that proposed by Professor Coffey. Id. at 648 n.5, 485 P.2d at 109 n.5; see Coffey,
supra note 5, at 377. There are two principle distinctions. First, Professor Coffey delineates the
various ways in which the investor's initial value can be subjected to the risks of the enterprise,
i.e., proprietary interest in the enterprise; creditor's claims against the enterprise; recommittal of
property to use or control by the enterprise; value paid in recognition of anticipated, but, as yet
unrealized, success of the enterprise; and a conditional right to receive payments. Id. at 377, 384-
96. Secondly, while the court emphasizes "the right to exercise practical and actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise," 52 Hawaii at 648-49, 651-52, 485 P.2d at 109, III,
Professor Coffey characterizes investor participation as follows: "[A]t the time of the transaction,
the buyer is not familiar with the operations of the enterprise or does not receive the right to
participate in the management of the enterprise." Coffey, supra note 5, at 377.
"The leading case advocating this risk analysis to the question of security vel non is Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). Silver
Hills involved the sale of memberships in a nascent country club. The memberships granted the
purchaser and his immediate family the use of club facilities, but no right "in the income or assets
of the club." Id. at 813, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Justice Traynor, in finding a security,
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largely on the ability of the promoter to convince prospective founder-
members of the probable success of the venture.-' Secondly, noting that
the organization membership was limited to five thousand persons and,
also, that memberships would increase geometrically, the court rea-
soned, "[A] very large percentage of founder-members [would] be to-
tally dependent on sales commissions to recover their initial investment
plus income.' 52 The fact that the ind.cements leading to the investments
were based on fixed returns rather than a share in profits was termed
irrelevant. The court indicated that "[t]he unwary investor lured by
promises of fixed fees deserves the same protection as a participant in
a profit sharing plan."53
Finally, investor participation in Hawaii Market Center was seen
as being minor and certainly not rising to the required level of manage-
rial control. 4 The reason for requiring practical and actual control was
that such control would have given the investor the ability and opportun-
ity to safeguard his investment "thus obviating the need for state inter-
vention. '5 .
Though the Glenn Turner case does change the traditional test for
an investment contract, it seems, nevertheless, to adhere closely to the
avowed policies underlying judicial interpretation of the federal securi-
ties laws. " This confluence is clearly shown by contrasting Glenn Turner
with SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., in which, on facts parallelling
focused on protection for those who risk their capital "in legitimate ventures whether or not they
expect a return on their capital in one form or another." Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal.
Rptr. at 188.
1152 Hawaii at 650, 485 P.2d at 110.
52Id.
111d. at 651, 485 P.2d at 110. The Securities Exchange Commission advocates basically the
same position, saying, "Nor is it significant that the return promised for the use of an investor's
money may be something other than a share of the profits of the enterprise." SEC Release at
80,975; cf. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); see
text accompanying notes 78-83 infra.
1152 Hawaii at 651-52, 485 P.2d at 11l. Again, the SEC is in substantial agreement with the
Hawaiian court. The Commission believes that investor efforts, though financially significant and
contributing to the enterprise's success, may nevertheless be irrelevant "if the investor does not
control the use of his funds to a significant degree." SEC Release at 80,975. Furthermore, the SEC
construes the reference to "efforts of others" in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946),
as limited "to those types of essential managerial efforts but for which the anticipated return could
not be produced." SEC Release at 80,975.
552 Hawaii at 652, 485 P.2d at 11l. The court adds that the focus should be "on the quality
of the participation." Id.
"These policies are discussed in the text accompanying notes 17-26 supra.
11CCH FED. SEc.L. REP. 93, 960 (N.D. Ga. April 19, 1973).
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those in Glenn Turner, a federal district court found no investment
contract. Koscot, a sister corporation of Dare to Be Great, Inc. in the
parent organization of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 was techni-
cally in the business of marketing a line of cosmetics. As with Dare,
however, the real attraction to investors was the potential profit to be
derived from the successful recruitment of others into the organization
through the use of high-pressure sales methods.0
In spite of itscharacterization of the Koscot pyramid sales plan as
a "get-rich-quick scheme in the worst sense,"6 the court refused to
accept the invitation extended by the Glenn Turner case. Two distinct
bases for the adherence to the strict "solely" standard were presented:
first, the Koscot court viewed the Glenn Turner holding as "a new,
different and more expansive standard in light of . . binding higher
court decisions;"'" secondly, the efforts of the investors were not viewed
as token, but rather as fundamental and substantial ones without which
"distributors cannot expect any money from Koscot. ' '6 2
The portrayal of the Glenn Turner holding as "new, different and
more expansive" presents a point of sharp distinction with the Ninth
Circuit view that the holding does not "represent any real departure
from the Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract as set
out in Howey."63 This distinction comes into clearer focus if one credits
the premise that the definition of a security should be keyed to economic
realities. 4 While the district court in Koscot made what might be inter-
preted as a standard reference to the remedial nature of the legislation
and the need to focus on economic realities," the Ninth Circuit and the
"Franchise Symposium, Dare to be Great, Inc.!: A Case Study of Pyramid Sales Plan
Regulation, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 676, 677, 694 n.57 (1972).
I'CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 93,960 at 93,845. For a full explanation of the business methods
of Koscot, see Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
ICCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,960 at 93,845.
"Id. at 93,846. In addition, Chief Judge Smith, in Koscot, indicated that regulation of fran-
chises generally under the securities laws required a definite broadening in the scope of the legisla-
tion. Id. at 93,848 n.l. In Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F. Supp. 95, 98 n.1 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (opinion by Smith, C.J.) he said that such broadening "should originate with the Congress,"
11CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 93,960 at 93,846.
1474 F.2d at 483. One writer-feels that the Howey Court did not intend the literal meaning
to attach to the word "solely." As support, he asserts that the factual situation in Hovey happened
to provide a situation which facilitates attachment of the literal meaning and cites Blackwell v.
Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); Coleman, supra note
5, at 503-04; see note 76 infra.
"See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Coffey, supra note 5, at 376-77, see
text accompanying note 26 supra.
"See. e.g., Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wieboldt
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Oregon district court actually reasoned from these philosophical under-
pinnings. For instance, Judge Skopil, at the district level in Glenn
Turner, asserted that it was not clear that the Howey definition was
intended to be applied as a "litmus test," and continued,
A narrow focus on this particular locution seems anomalous for the
court has already said . . . that liberal and broad interpretations [of
the statutes] are required in order to carry out the intent of Congress.
From this flows the court's stress on the economic realities behind
transactions, on substance rather than form.66
The Ninth Circuit reinforces this emphasis on the substance of the
transaction and economic realities in its careful scrutiny of the efforts
required of both parties by the Dare scheme. In return for investment
of his money, his time and effort to find and induce prospects to attend
meetings, and the cost of an affluent appearance,67 the investor-
purchaser receives a share in the proceeds of the selling efforts of the
Dare organization which the court views as "the sine qua non of the
scheme; those efforts are what keeps it going; those efforts are what
produces the money which is to make him rich. 68
The Koscot court indicated that, if the efforts of the investors there
had been "token," the scheme might have fallen within the traditional
definition of an investment contract. 9 The Glenn Turner court, on the
other hand, would not find a security if the investors contributed "essen-
tial managerial efforts."70 The controversy thus centers in the middle
ground of "fundamental and substantial efforts" not rising to the level
of control. Why does the presence of such efforts serve to remove the
transaction from the watchful eye and the swift hand of securities regu-
lation? Traditionally, the active investor has been thought to have less
v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 256-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc.,
324 F. Supp. 640, 641-42 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
11348 F. Supp. at 774; accord, Nash & Assoc., Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th
Cir. 1973); Lino v. City Investing Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,124 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1973).
17474 F.2d at 482. "The 'salesman' is . . . told that to maximize his chances of success he
should impart an aura of affluence, whether spurious or not. . . . He is told to 'fake it 'til you
make it.' . I..." d. at 480.
"'Id. at 482.
11CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,960 at 93,846.
7474 F.2d at 482, 483; cf. Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968),
cited with approval by the Glenn Turner district court, 348 F. Supp. at 775, where a determination
of no investment contract resulted from a finding that the parties were engaged in "a joint venture,
each to contribute substantial services or capital or both in furtherance of the venture . . . the
success of which depended to an important degree upon [the investor's] services and activity in the
venture." 289 F. Supp. at 315.
19731
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need for the protections provided by the federal securities laws since, by
virtue of his non-monetary involvement in the enterprise, he should be
in a better position than the passive investor to protect his own invest-
ment.7' This superiority, though, is only present in relation to the passive
investor. When compared to the investor who exercises essential mana-
gerial efforts, the active investor is seen as dependent on the success of
the promoter; in other words, effective control is in the promoter. 2 This
dependency or lack of effective control has been viewed as crucial in
determining the existence of an investment contract. 73
The essential managerial.-efforts approach of the Glenn Turner
court would seem to look not at how much effort is required of the
investor, but rather at what kind of effort is required. 74 In the opinion
of some commentators this emphasis on the quality of investor partici-
pation is essential in light of the economic realities of security transac-
tions. 7"5 One commentator even indicates that, in spite of the gloss later
decisions have given the Howey test, the Howey court may have in-
tended that the analysis should be of the quality of investor participation
rather than of the amount.7 From the standpoint of investor protection,
such a qualitative approach seems appropriate since an investor with
"
1Cf. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 460
F.2d 666 (1972). In Mr. Steak, the franchise agreement provided that the franchisor would have
significant control over the franchisee's receipts and operations. Id. at 643-44. It was contemplated
that the franchisee "would play an active, if severely circumscribed, role in the conduct of the
restaurant." Id. at 645. The franchisee's active participation and his status as an informed investor
were factors prompting the court to a finding of no security. Id. See also Coleman, supra note 5,
at 503-04.
2See Coffey, supra note 5, at 396; Note, 61 Gao. L.J., supra note 5, at 1279-80,
"Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. III. 1973); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 111.
App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965); State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St.
101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956); see Long, supra note 5, at 170-74.
7 This qualitative approach bears striking similarity to a part of the definition of an investment
contract formulated in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 649, 652, 485 P.2d
105, 109, Il 1(1971); see text accompanying note 49 supra.75Goodwin, supra note 5, at 1318-19; Long, supra note 5, at 170-72; cf Note, 61 Gao. L.J,
supra note 5, at 1279-80, 1286-87.
6See Long, supra note 5, at 144-46, where Professor Long says, "[I]f the [Hlowey] test is
followed literally, all the Howey Company would have had to do would be to require the investor
to pick a single orange." Id. at 145: In advocating lack of direct control as a factor militating for
a finding of a security, Long points out significant language in the Howey opinion, quoting as
follows: "'A common enterprise managed by respondents or third-parties with adequate personnel
and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of return
on their investments. . . . Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present
here. The investor provides the capital and shares in the earnings and profits, the promoters
manage, control and operate the enterprise.'" Id. at 176 (emphasis by Long), quoting SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946).
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actual control can be "the master of his own destiny"7 thus obviating
the need for the protection provided by the federal securities laws.
Notwithstanding the appropriateness of the Glenn Turner ap-
proach, the failure of the Ninth Circuit Court to explore the possible
inadequacy of the Howey test's insistence on an expectation of profits78
warrants comment. The risk capital approach ennunciated by Justice
Traynor in Silver Hills County Club v. Sobieski9 and amplified by State
v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.80 provides what some consider to be a
more satisfactory approach8" and one in which the controlling efforts
analysis forms a part.8" The federal courts, however, seem content to
restrict application of the risk capital analysis to those "situations where
exceptionally high risk speculative franchises are involved."8"
The Glen Turner court's change in the traditional test is best viewed
as a step along the road to a test fully consistent with the economic
realities of a security. Although the court only went as far as the facts
presented necessitated, its analysis of investor participation should be
appreciated and its fealty to basic policy considerations commended.
DAVID R. FRANKSTONE
"Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
" 328 U.S. at 298, 301.
"55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); see note 50 supra.
'"52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); see text accompanying notes 42-55 supra.
"Coffey, supra note 5, at 374-76, 395-96; Long, supra note 5, at 167-70.
"See. e.g., Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 258-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The controversy in
Wieboldt involved a contract entitling the investor to operate a Simplified Business And Tax
Center. Conceding that he had no investment contract under the traditional test, Wieboldt urged
the adoption of a risk capital approach to the definition of an investment contract. Id. at 258.
Speaking to the element of control, the court said:
[Il]t is only necessary that the franchisee exercise policy-making power over his unit of
the enterprise. . . . Only franchise agreements, like those found in Turner, which give
the franchisee no meaningful control over his own enterprise (or, of course, that of the
franchisor) should be considered investment contracts within this interpretation of the
"risk capital" approach.
Id. at 260.
"Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd,
460 F.2d 666 (1972); accord, Weiboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This
limitation, perhaps, stems from a reluctance on the part of the federal courts to provide for
regulation of all franchises, see Note, 61 GEo. L.J., supra note 5, at 1287. The position that
franchises should come within the purview of the securities laws is argued by Goodwin, supra note
5, who sees a need for availability of the anti-fraud provisions (especially lOb-5) which can, with
appropriate legislation, be made available without the necessity of registration and the concomit-
tant harrassment of the legitimate franchisor. Id. at 1321.
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